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ABSTRACT 
 The United States Marine Corps continues to develop Expeditionary Advanced 
Base Operations (EABO) as the future operating model in the Pacific.  EABO will 
employ Marines using widely dispersed, low profile, highly potent, and tightly integrated 
Navy and Marine Corps teams.  This operating model challenges the Marine Corps’ 
ability to command and control due to inherent resource limitations, long communication 
ranges, and the enemy’s ability to detect, intercept, and interfere in the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  This study sought to evaluate bursty-signal mesh network (BSMN) 
technology as a potential solution to these problems.  The technology’s suitability was 
evaluated through a comparison of the character of command and control in EABO 
(established through qualitative case study analysis of recent EABO exercises) against 
the characteristics of BSMN technology (established through quantitative modeling 
analysis).  Finally, the viability of acquiring and fielding the technology was evaluated 
through a quantitative financial analysis.  Though the researchers recommend further 
study, they conclude that BSMN technology’s long-range, stealth, and low-power 
capabilities are well suited for communication at-and-below the regimental level.  
Further, researchers conclude that the technology is viable to acquire and field, with a 
price point far below other long-range communication assets (i.e., satellite 
communication) currently in use. 
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Since World War II, the United States’ capability to project military power 
from the sea with physically massive and exquisitely capable aircraft carriers and 
amphibious ships has gone largely uncontested (Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
[COMNAVSURFOR], 2017; Jackson et al., 2020). In recent years, however, the 
development and proliferation of long-range precision anti-ship missiles, which endanger 
naval vessels long before they are in range of their objective, has challenged the way United 
States naval forces operate (Office of the Secretary of Defense [SecDef], 2017, p. 57). In 
response to the threat of long-range anti-ship missiles, the Department of the Navy has 
developed a new strategy of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), in which widely 
dispersed naval forces with greater individual lethality achieve sea control, instead of the 
relatively dense and vulnerable formations of previous naval operating models 
(COMNAVSURFOR, 2017). Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) 
(Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], 2021) is the Marine Corps’ operating concept 
which actualizes the principles of DMO by deploying forces in a highly integrated, widely 
dispersed, and physically and electromagnetically stealthy manner (COMNAVSURFOR, 
2017; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2018; HQMC, 2021). 
One of several warfighting functions that require refinement to fully support DMO 
is command and control (C2): in the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Marine 
Corps Commandant, General Berger, explicitly cites the need for flexible and resilient C2 
systems that support high tempo and decentralized decision making (Commandant of the 
Marine Corps [CMC], 2019, p. 9). The researchers’ preliminary understanding of emerging 
bursty-signal mesh network (BSMN) technology was informed by the research of exhibited 
in Bordetsky, Benson, and Hughes’ Signal Magazine article, “Hiding Comms in Plain 
Sight” (2016): this article lends to the hypothesis that BSMN technology could offer the 
flexibility and resilience desired for DMO C2. Bursty-signal is simply defined as the 
method of transmitting a large amount of data in a relatively short burst of radiation 
(Cambridge, n.d.), which lends itself to an inherently lower probability of the detection, 
interception, or interference by adversaries (Walkenhorst, 2020). A mesh network is a 
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communication network scheme in which nodes are able to serve as dynamic routers to 
pass transmissions to other nodes, creating dynamic and flexible networks without any 
infrastructure beyond the users themselves (Law, 2009). Between these attributes, the 
researchers hypothesize that BSMN technology is a suitable technological solution to 
provide flexible and resilient communications for C2 in EABO. Researchers further 
hypothesize that, given the current commercial use of BSMNs, it is also a financially viable 
solution for C2 in EABO. 
To determine the suitability of BSMN technology for DMO, the researchers first 
conducted case studies of Marine Corps exercises modeled after EABO. These case studies 
sought to characterize both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of C2 in EABO 
exercises to determine what manner of communication BSMN would have to support to be 
a suitable technological solution. The researchers studied three separate cases, spanning 
over two years, and involving several Marine Corps units across I and III Marine 
Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), as well as U.S. 3d Fleet, and Army Special Operating Forces 
(SOF), and ranging from the battalion to the MEF-level (3d Marine Division 
[3dMARDIV], 2019; 9th Communications Battalion [9th Comm], 2019; 1st Battalion, 6th 
Marine Regiment [1/6], 2020).  
While the case material was sufficient for a preliminary BSMN suitability analysis, 
the researchers strongly recommend further study with more comprehensive and precise 
source material, particularly relating to the technical aspects of C2 in EABO. In summary, 
the key conceptual and technical lessons derived from these case studies are as follows: 
Organizational observations and recommendations 
o Additional guidance for the integration of the naval force (i.e., Navy, 
Marine, and Coast Guard) is needed. Given the stated desire for tight naval 
integration down to the EAB level (CMC, 2019; HQMC, 2021), BSMN 
will have to be designed with the interoperability of a variety of naval 
platforms in mind to be a suitable technological C2 solution. 
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o Authorities for activities, like intelligence and fires, are best vested at the 
lowest level feasible (e.g., at the Littoral Combat Team [LCT] level for the 
launch of HIMARS in a sea-denial role) (HQMC, 2021). 
o Communications systems take on two distinct characteristics depending on 
the echelon of command in question: units at and below the Marine 
Littoral Regiment (MLR) level require communications systems that 
prioritize a lower probability of detection and interception, higher 
scalability, lower power consumption, and channels plentiful enough to 
support the required doctrinal networks (1/6, 2020; HQMC, 2021). At and 
above the division level, communications systems should prioritize 
throughput (i.e., data rate capacity) and bandwidth (3dMARDIV, 2019; 
9th Comm, 2019) to support data-rich communications, like video-
teleconferencing.  
Institutional observations and recommendations 
o Across the Marine Corps, tactical-level commanders must be chosen, 
trained, and empowered to take tactical actions that will have strategic 
impacts (HQMC, 1997, 2021; CMC, 2019).  
o The naval force must renew its emphasis on mission command to allow 
EABO forces to act with initiative and expedience, particularly in the 
absence of continuous or data-rich communications (HQMC, 2018; 
3dMARDIV, 2019; 9th Comm, 2019; HQMC, 2021).  
o Considering the importance of mission command to EABO operations 
(HQMC, 2018, 2021), the researchers and this study’s advisor recognize 
that operational EABO communications are likely to occur in hourly, 
daily, or even weekly bursts, coined as the bursty rhythm of C2. The 
researchers assert that the operational tempo of EABO units will correlate 
to the regularity of C2 bursts: thus, increasing the rhythm of bursty C2 will 
increase unit tempo. The researchers stress that the quality of information 
xx 
in these bursts must also be high and should adhere to the principles of 
mission command. 
o Given the high degree of integration of different naval forces in EABO, 
emphasis on providing liaisons vertically and horizontally in the force 
structure have shown to be highly beneficial and should be given emphasis 
as a means of improving unit-intrinsic communication (3dMARDIV, 
2019). 
• The following technical observations concern measurable aspects of 
communications in the cases studied. Members of Marine Corps fleet forces assert 
that EABO communications belong in two distinct categories separated by, what 
they coined as, the “digital divide” (3dMARDIV, 2019, p. 2): the digital divide 
lies between the regimental and division level: communications above the divide 
(above the MLR) require high bandwidth and throughput to support data-rich 
communication applications; communications below the MLR level, in contrast, 
prioritize power savings, flexibility and scalability, and stealth. The researchers 
recommend further study with more detailed source material to verify these 
technical observations (3dMARDIV, 2019; 9th Comm, 2019; 1/6, 2020).  
o The maximum transmission ranges below the digital divide were 
measured between 30 and 90 miles (50 to 150 km), while transmissions 
above the digital divide were measured at 90 miles (150 km) 
(3dMARDIV, 2019; 9th Comm, 2019; 1/6, 2020). 
o Units below the digital divide operated under constraints of 60 MHz of 
bandwidth and data rates of 9.6 kbps. Units above the digital divide used 
systems with data rates upwards of 3 Mbps to 1 Gbps (3dMARDIV, 2019; 
9th Comm, 2019; 1/6, 2020). 
o Units above the digital divide were relatively unconstrained by power 
requirements due to access to infrastructural power capabilities (grid and 
industrial generator power). Units below the digital divide were 
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constrained to 50 W for vehicle mounted communication systems, and 
around 20 W for man-portable communication systems (3dMARDIV, 
2019; 9th Comm, 2019; 1/6, 2020; L3Harris Technologies 2019).  
o Units operating below the digital divide are constrained in antenna size 
due to their expeditionary nature: typical antennas for vehicle mounted 
and man-portable communication systems are under 35 ft (11 meters) 
long. Units above the digital divide commonly use antenna that are 113 ft 
(35 meters) tall (3dMARDIV, 2019; 9th Comm, 2019; 1/6, 2020; 
Headquarters Army, 1991; Contact Corporation, n.d.). 
o While the number of nodes (i.e., the points in a communication network 
from/through/to which data flows) was difficult to estimate, units below 
the digital divide ranged from 40 to 120 nodes, and those above the digital 
divide were estimated to be as many as 1,500 (3dMARDIV, 2019; 9th 
Comm, 2019; 1/6, 2020). 
With the conceptual and technical characteristics of BSMN thus identified, the 
researchers then conducted a technical study of BSMN technology through conceptual 
technical modeling (i.e., the conceptual simulation of a system bound by technical 
parameters) (Tatomir et al., 2018). These models sought to compare the operational 
characteristics of two different BSMN modulation schemes (Chirp-signal Spread Spectrum 
(CSS) and Long Range (LoRa).) against EABO requirements. The modeling of BSMN in 
this study yielded the following essential characteristics (listed by CSS and LoRa, 
respectively): a maximum range of 150 km and 125 km; a power requirement of 0.5 W and 
0.158 W; and a directional antenna diameter of 0.5 m (~20”).  
With these figures modeled, the researchers conclude that these BSMN methods 
are suitable for supporting C2 below the digital divide in EABO operations; further, adding 
power could also render BSMN suitable for C2 above the digital divide, though researchers 
recommend caution, as adding power decreases the LPI/LPD qualities of BSMN, as well 
as sacrificing the logistical advantages of low power consumption.  
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Finally, given these findings on the potential suitability of BSMN for EABO, the 
question of the viability (i.e., the realistic potential for developing, acquiring, and 
employing the technology) was answered through a financial analysis in which a 
forecasting model was developed to estimate to total program life cycle cost of acquiring, 
developing, deploying, and maintaining the software and hardware required to establish a 
space-based terminals to include in a BSMN topology. After analysis, this study 
demonstrated the total cost of a BSMN space-based constellation at LEO would be less 
than 1% of the entire WGS program budget and less than the average yearly funding 
allocation for the WGS program. As such the researchers are that it is financial viability to 
fund such a program.  
In conclusion, researchers fail to reject the hypothesis: BSMN is a suitable and 
viable technological solution for supporting C2 in Distributed Lethality operations in 
support of EABO below the digital divide (150 km). However, further testing and research 
should be conducted to conduct field testing and support the theoretical conclusions of this 
study. Lastly, based on total cost estimation and financial forecasting analysis, it is 
reasonably feasible for the DOD to develop, deploy, and maintain the software and 
hardware required to establish a space-based terminals to include in a BSMN topology as 
it is less than one percent of the acquisition program baseline for the established Wideband 
Global Satellite system.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Navy and Marine Corps leadership have identified Littoral Operations in a 
Contested Environment (LOCE) through Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(EABO) as the future naval operating model (Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
[COMNAVSURFOR], 2017; Headquarters, Marine Corps [HQMC], 2021). However, the 
practices and systems by which a commander understands the enemy and environment and 
makes known their intent for action (i.e., command and control [C2]) (HQMC, 2018), 
remains in development for EABO (Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC], 2019). 
Furthermore, the C2 systems and practices used in recent operations in the Middle East 
may not be suitable to support EABO due to the different environment, enemy, and means 
of operating. Specifically, in the researcher’s experience, the C2 systems used in recent 
operations in the Middle East often required hardened infrastructure to operate (e.g., large, 
semi-permanent antenna and massive power generating facilities): many of these 
requirements are unlikely to be available in prolonged deployments to austere 
environments without creating significant logistical and electromagnetic footprints, both 
of which are vulnerable to detection and attack by enemy forces (CMC, 2019).  
These shortfalls present a risk-to-force and risk-to-mission when conducting 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and EABO in contested environments. These 
risks to EABO can be reduced by increasing the resiliency and decreasing detectability of 
the force’s C2 networks. The researchers sought to evaluate the suitability of bursty-signal 
mesh networks (BSMN) in achieving resilient and stealthy C2 networks, as well as the 
financial viability of developing, procuring, and fielding BSMN technology.  
B. HYPOTHESIS 
In the article Hiding Comms in Plain Sight (2016), Bordetsky, Benson, and Hughes 
offer mesh network communication technology as a suitable communication solution for 
providing the reliability, agility, and scalability demanded by future maritime operations. 
Bordetsky et al. further expand on the potential use of littoral combat ships as critical nodes 
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within this hypothetical network, and the capacity of such a communication network to 
support unmanned systems. Furthermore, the authors describe bursty transmission methods 
of transmitting signals within the mesh network that decrease the probability of detection 
and interception by adversaries (Bordetsky et al., 2016). The combined effect of self-
healing and evolving networks that transmit signals discretely is to create a communication 
apparatus that is difficult to detect, disrupt, or interpret: this is the essence of BSMN, and 
is worth investigating for use in EABO. 
With this initial understanding of both the communication problem in EABO, and 
the advertised benefits of BSMN, the researchers hypothesized that BSMN is a suitable 
technological solution to provide both the resilience and stealth required for C2 in EABO.  
Furthermore, and given the current commercial use of BSMN technology, the researchers 
hypothesize that BSMN is financially viable to develop and field BSMNs. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Literature Introduction 
The researchers regarded the stated problem as being composed of three primary 
elements. First, the research question concerns a specific expression, or form, of military 
operations (i.e., EABO) which must be thoroughly understood. This area of research and the 
literature that informs it is listed below as National Security Guidance. Second, the research 
question concerns the essential nature of C2, the literature concerning which is listed as 
Command-and-Control literature. Finally, within the context of these two subjects, the 
research question addresses a specific technology to support C2 in the specific military 
operation, the literature concerning which is listed as Bursty-Signal Mesh Network literature. 
2. National Security Guidance Literature 
The United States’ uncontested military dominance over the last three decades is 
disappearing at an alarming rate. The unfettered, worldwide access for U.S. forces, its 
allies, and commercial industry is vulnerable to emerging global threats. Global powers are 
increasingly applying their own instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military, 
and economic) to increase their regional and international influence. “It has been decades 
since we last competed for sea control, sea lines of communication, access to world 
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markets, and diplomatic partnerships” (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2018). In 
response, the United States has published clear guidance and direction to combat these 
threats and ensure the United States will maintain global superiority.  
a. National Security Strategy 2017 
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) identified, acknowledged, and 
addressed the threats to, “United States in pursuit of shared interests, values, and 
aspirations” (White House, 2017, p. 1), and has stated that the “United States will respond 
to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world” 
(White House, 2017, p. 2). It acknowledges that the United States’ significant competitive 
advantages are shrinking as rival states modernize and build up their governments, 
economic institutions, and conventional militaries. Technological advances and access to 
global markets have empowered state actors to influence both regional and international 
arenas. Competitors are specifically challenging the western culture and economic 
structures to gain leverage for their own gain and prosperity. “Rival actors use propaganda 
and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and 
spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners” 
(White House, 2017, p. 3).  
The NSS also addressed how critical collection, analysis, and access to data will be 
to leveraging power and influence at an international level. “The contest over information 
accelerates these political, economic, and military competitions” (White House, 2017).  
b. National Defense Strategy 2018 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) echoes the key themes of the NSS, 
however, it directly applies the threats and responses from a military perspective and aligns 
its strategies to nest with those from the NSS. Specifically, it highlights the military’s 
hostile operating environment. “Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, 
and cyberspace” (Secretary of Defense [SecDef], 2018, p. 3). Former Secretary of Defense 
Jim Mattis stated, “In a security environment where the homeland is no longer a sanctuary 
and every operating domain is contested, competitors and adversaries will continue to 
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operate across geographic regions and span multiple domains to offset or erode Joint Force 
advantages” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2018, p. 2).  
c. Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, 2018 
The Department of the Navy further aggregated all the strategic concepts and goals 
from the NSS, NDS, and National Military Strategy (NMS) to develop tangible capabilities 
to enable a secure and versatile tactical network to support Joint and Naval operations in 
contested environments. The Chief of Naval Operations stated in 2018 that it will 
“aggressively compete, harnessing three forces that continue to shape our modern security 
environment:  
i. The increasing use of the maritime domain—the oceans, seas, waterways, 
and seafloor.  
ii. The rise of global information systems, especially the role of data in 
decision making.  
iii. The increasing rate of technological creation and adoption. We will adapt 
to this reality and respond with urgency.” (CNO, 2018, p. 3)  
In pursuit of these three broad objectives, the Chief of Naval Operations directed 
the naval force to concentrate on developing and employing forces according to the 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) model, which enhances resiliency in contested 
environments (CNO, 2018). “This architecture will provide accurate, timely, and analyzed 
information to units, warfighting groups, and fleets” (CNO, 2018, p. 10). The operational 
architecture will include scalability to support Joint and coalition forces. “It will include a 
development environment to rapidly generate enhancements and support its continued 
evolution” (CNO, 2018, p. 10).  
d. DOD Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 
the PRC 
The annual DOD reports to congress (the latest published as of 2020) regarding the 
Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China is a 
comprehensive description of China’s strategic posture, capabilities, and intentions. The 
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report describes the situation in the Pacific which prompts the Distributed Lethality (DL) 
strategy and summarizes tactical/technical data useful for defining C2 requirements for 
BSMN (e.g., data concerning China’s missile threat ranges and capabilities). 
e. United States Marine Corps’ Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2019 
In the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Commandant’s Planning Guidance 
2019, C2 is described as a critical function which is challenged by peer threats in future 
Pacific conflicts. The passage of information through C2 and information operations 
remains imperative, but with a caveat that signature management and reduction is also a 
priority for C2 systems (CMC, 2019). This document and its outlined priorities for research 
are a primary motivation for the conduct of this study.  
f. Marine Corps Force Design 2030 
Realigning force design and the composition of the Marine Corps relative to the 
potential peer-level conflict in the Pacific is identified in the 38th Commandant’s Planning 
Guidance (2019) as a top priority. The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 outlines concepts 
in support of Distributed Lethality (DL) and/or DMO, including the Marine Littoral 
Regiment (MLR) force design (CMC, 2020). 
3. Command-and-Control Literature 
Literature addressing the concepts and techniques for command and control can be 
broken down into three essential categories in the context of this research. The first 
category, hereafter called C2 theory, contains literature that broadly describes the process 
of communicating with application beyond a strictly military context. The second category 
is military C2 literature, which is written by military entities, and specifically applies to a 
military context. The third and final category is EABO C2 literature, which is not only of 
a military nature, but also applies specifically to the context of the EABO. 
a. Command and Control Theory 
In 1949, Weaver published Recent Contributions to Mathematical Theory of 
Communication, with contributions from Shannon. In this work, Weaver described a theory 
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that broke down communication into three distinct levels, applicable to all kinds of 
communicative interactions, whether it be verbal exchanges, technical/digital 
communication, or even artistic and musical expressions (Weaver, 1949). Briefly, these 
three levels are the technical, semantic, and effectiveness aspects of a communication 
system. This research will address Level A (the technical aspect of communication) of 
Weaver’s theory. The case studies in this thesis used to derive the elements of effective 
communication in contested littoral environments will use Weaver’s theory and 
terminology to draw distinctions in observed C2 aspects of the cases studied.  
b. Military C2 Literature 
Military C2 literature draws from both civilian studies of C2 and from doctrinal 
publications directing the planning and execution of C2 in military operations. With regard 
to civilian studies of C2 in a military context, the RAND Institute’s 1999 study, Command 
Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control (Builder et al., 
1999) provides a theory of command and control which suggests ten distinct metrics for 
measuring the success of command and control in military operations. This study bases 
these metrics on the case studies of several major military operations. This study could 
benefit from not only an analysis of contemporary case studies (particularly with relevance 
to EABO), but also to informing the authors as to how to structure their own case studies.  
The primary foundational documents concerning C2 in terms of common 
naval/military understanding is the doctrinal publications for the Marine Corps, Marine 
Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6: Command and Control (HQMC, 2018). This 
publication provides the language and conceptual framework with which to define the 
command-and-control constructs being compared.  
c. EABO Command and Control Literature 
The most recent and substantial literature concerning EABO, the Tentative Manual 
for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (HQMC, 2021) emerged during the course 
of this study. The stated primary purpose of the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary 
Advanced Base Operations is to provide context and direction for the future 
experimentation and development of EABO concepts. This document includes information 
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concerning, among other topics, force structures, mission, and fundamental definitions and 
considerations for EABO that proved useful for this study.  
d. EABO Case Study Literature 
The conceptual and technical characterization of C2 in EABO was derived from 
unclassified After-Action Reports (AARs) from the AAR repository at the Marine Corps 
Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) website. The three exercises examined in these case 
studies were: 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment’s Exercise Northern Apache (1st 
Battalion, 6th Marines [1/6], 2020), the account of which comes from a single, but 
relatively comprehensive, AAR; III Marine Expeditionary Force’s Marine Expeditionary 
Force Exercise, 2019 (MEFEX-19), which was informed by AARs from two participating 
units (3d Marine Division [3dMARDIV], 2019; and I Marine Expeditionary Force’s 
Exercise Pacific Blitz, which draws from two subordinate unit AARs (3dMARDIV, 2019; 
Marine Air Squadron 6 [MASS-6], 2019).  
The use of AARs as the sole source of case study documentation in this study is 
suboptimal for the purpose of understanding C2 completely. Originally, the researchers 
sought to build case studies from comprehensive documentation of exercises resembling 
EABO: documents would have included complete operation orders to build an 
understanding of the commander’s vision of the enemy and environment, their intent to 
act, and particular aspects of timeframe, tasks to accomplish, contingencies, and other 
insights examined in Command Concepts (Builder et al., 1999). Researchers also sought to 
conduct focused interviews with leaders experienced in the exercises in question. Due to a 
lack of interest, however, these interviews were not accomplished. 
4. Current DOD Electromagnetic Capabilities 
The proliferation of communication infrastructure and technologies over the last 
three decades have created an environment in which strategic leaders and military 
commanders have reasonable expectations to maintain a robust, consistent, and reliable 
communication network capability. Commanders have become accustomed to on-demand 
access to both wired and wireless communication technologies to transmit and receive 
messages throughout the chain of command using much of the electromagnetic spectrum 
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(Hoehn et al., 2021). DOD wireless communications use specific radio frequencies and are 
constrained by range, bandwidth, and power requirements and limitations. “The DOD 
supports strategic communication by maintaining a robust network of terrestrial and 
satellite communications, spanning the electromagnetic spectrum from [extremely low 
frequency] to [extremely high frequency], that supports survivable command and control, 
worldwide, of U.S. military forces” (Stine & Portigal, 2004). However, much of the DOD’s 
strategic radio communication is conducted on military and commercial satellite services 
(Stine & Portigal, 2004). Additionally, the DOD employs radio communications for 
command and control and passage of information amongst its tactical units to support their 
warfighting functions (Stine & Portigal, 2004). However, the land-based (tactical) 
waveforms generally reside in the radio segment of the electromagnetic spectrum and are 
limited to a designated frequency range of 3 megahertz (MHz) to 2 gigahertz (GHz) and 
space-based wave forms (strategic) generally range from 3 to 30 GHz (Stine & Portigal, 
2004). Each segment of the electromagnetic spectrum maintains relative advantages and 
disadvantages regarding maximum transmission range, bandwidth and data rate capacity, 
power requirements, antenna dimension requirements, and node service capacity. These 
requirements are critical to the evaluation of the suitability and feasibility during 
employment to support DMO in EABO.  
a. DOD Waveforms and Frequency Bands 
The DOD employs many different waveforms which range the electromagnetic 
spectrum to support strategic, operational, and tactical operations. Each waveform 
maintains unique characteristics which provide critical capabilities to its users; however, 
each waveform is also subject to limitations which may not be suitable or feasible for every 
environment. Per the 2020 DOD Communication Waveform Inventory, there are 65 unique 
waveforms employed by the DOD. Despite the robust number of waveforms, each one falls 
within a particular frequency band on the electromagnetic spectrum. Table 1 provides a 
summary of characteristics of each frequency band employed by the DOD. As displayed, 
the majority of the ground-based or terrestrial communication waveforms reside between 
the 3 MHz to 2 GHz frequency range, while satellite and space-based waveforms reside 
between 2–75 GHz range. As discussed, performance is based on the characteristics of 
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waveforms produced at each frequency band and relative to requirements and capabilities 
needed to support operations. According to the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary 
Advanced Base Operations (HQMC, 2021), planners supporting EABO and operating in 
contested environments must meet specific requirements to ensure they employ and 
execute an effective, resilient, and scalable communication network.  
The red box in Table 1 indicates the communication bands typically in use by 
tactical-level units (under the regimental level, to be defined which is a term described in 
detail later in this study). In the researchers’ experience, tactical-level units are limited to 
primarily high frequency (HF) and very-high frequency (VHF) assets due to scarcity of 
ultra-high frequency (UHF) and super-high frequency (SHF) SATCOM (1/6, 2020). These 
SATCOM assets are necessary for extending communications beyond the line of sight: 
currently, tactical units need more plentiful, long range communication assets, while 
satellite communications remain limited. 
The blue box in Table 1 indicates the communication bands typically utilized by 
higher and strategic-level assets above the digital divide: high throughput communications 
suites, strategic UAS, and other strategic assets are most often used by higher level entities 
where UHF and SHF SATCOM resources are more available. 
Table 1. Frequency Bands Characteristics Employed by DOD. 




(1) Ground Based Wave Forms 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) operate 
between 30 MHz to 87.975 MHz and remains in extensive use throughout tactical North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization organizations (Withington, 2017). 
Very High Frequency Line-of-Sight (VHF LOS), primarily supports LOS 
communications between operating units at ranges over 15–20 km over flat, open terrain 
(Pike & Sherman, 1999). 
Ultra High Frequency Line-of-Sight (UHF LOS) is employed by tactical units to 
transmit and receive information (both voice and data) in the UHF range (300 MHz - 3 
GHz) and “is capable of operating in either the UHF LOS or UHF Satellite 
Communications (UHF SATCOM) mode” (Pike & Sherman, 1999). UHF LOS is 
frequently used by airborne assets, as they generally operate at altitudes which negate LOS 
obstacles. The effective range of UHF LOS is generally 45–50 km over flat, open terrain. 
(2) Satellite/Space Based Waveforms 
Ultra-High Frequency Satellite Communications (UHF SATCOM) systems 
provides SATCOM communication links between mobile and land-based terminals. “The 
UHF SATCOM system also provides multichannel satellite transmission and reception, 
and is comprised of two distinct, but related, subsystems: UHF SATCOM receiving set, 
and UHF SATCOM transceivers and UHF Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) 
equipment” (Pike & Sherman, 1999). These terminals provide strategic access and critical 
distribution and reporting channels to support C2 of operations. These communication 
channels support a significant increase in range and bandwidth capabilities, as well as 
higher data capacity and faster transmissions. However, these benefits lead to increased 
demand beyond available resources. UHF SATCOM capabilities can be distributed to the 
tactical level to support strategic objectives; however, these cases are rare.  
The Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications (EHF SATCOM) 
system is one of three SATCOM systems which operates in the EHF range (30-300 GHz) 
(Pike & Sherman, 1999), and is well suited for general-purpose satellite communications 
that emphasize jam-resistance, low probability of interception, and secure voice, teleprinter 
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and data communication (Pike & Sherman, 1999). EHF SATCOM similarly offers 
increased range and bandwidth capabilities but is a scarce resource.  
The Super High Frequency Satellite Communications (SHF SATCOM) system 
operates in the range of 3–30 GHz, SHF range. SHF SATCOM supports satellite 
communication links between mobile and land terminals. SHF SATCOM systems, using 
crosslink capabilities create a large, mobile networks which can provide significant 
bandwidth capacity, and can be used as communication relays as well as telemetry, 
tracking, and control functions, for users and administrators. This network supports 
communication and data links for tactical, operational, and strategic operations (Pike & 
Sherman, 1999). “Shipboard SATCOM configurations vary in size and complexity and 
dependent upon the message traffic level, types of communications and operational 
missions of the ship” (Pike & Sherman, 1999). Additionally, SHF SATCOM 
communication is resistant to jamming and direction finding, which is significant for 
process operating within adversaries’ engagement zones (Pike & Sherman, 1999).  
b. EABO Communication Network Requirements 
As part of a strategic vision to counter adversaries’ anti-access area denial (A2AD) 
capabilities, the DOD is focused on developing “a networked security architecture capable 
of deterring aggression, assuring, and enhancing allies and partners, maintaining stability, 
and ensuring free access to common domains” (HQMC, 2021, p. 1-2). The evolving 
capabilities of adversaries in the Pacific arena challenge DOD operations in littoral regions. 
To support this endeavor, the DOD must employ a resilient, effective, and efficient 
communication network which has a low probability of detection and interception. 
“[Current] A2AD systems credibly threaten vessels in close and confined seas relatively 
near to adversary territory” (HQMC, 2021, p. 1-3). Thus, employing contemporary forces 
and capabilities based on the conventional C2 topologies and assumptions of uncontested 
naval, air, and communications superiority are challenged and potentially invalid. “The 
impending challenge is significant and cannot be met by merely refining current methods 
and capabilities” (HQMC, 2021, p. 1-2). In other words, EABO will require innovative and 
novel approaches to achieving C2, which allow friendly forces to communicate effectively, 
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even within the reach of enemy lethal and nonlethal capabilities. “It is critical that the 
composition, distribution, and disposition of forces executing EABO limit the adversary’s 
ability to target them, engage them with fires and other effects, and otherwise influence 
their activities” (HQMC, 2021, p. 1-4). These critical requirements present significant 
challenges for the DOD, many of which cannot be addressed using conventional C2 
topologies supported by traditional communication networks. The DOD must explore 
agile, low profile, and resilient C2 constructs and networks to support persistent EABO in 
contested environments. The researchers focused on identifying detailed requirements and 
potential C2 topologies, supported by a BSMN, which fulfill specific requirements for 
successful employment of EABO in contested environments.  
(1) Resiliency 
Resilient communication networks are critical to DOD’s C2 infrastructure. The 
ability to employ reliable, effective and efficient communication networks that directly 
support C2 functions are vital to continuous operations and mission success. A resilient 
communication network is one that can mitigate and withstand potential disruptions of 
service. As such the DOD prioritizes EM signature management as a measure of force 
protection and spectrum management to support operations and reduce risk to force and 
risk to mission.  
RF transmissions emit energy across the electromagnetic spectrum which can be 
detected, collected, and analyzed by passive signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems. These 
systems can listen to radio and radar frequencies or observe heat signatures of personnel, 
missiles, aircraft, artillery, and vehicles (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2020). 
The intelligence produced from the SIGINT capabilities are then exploited through the 
employment of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. “SIGINT capabilities allow military 
forces to understand where adversary forces are located as well as what frequencies they 
use for communications and radars” (CRS, 2020, p. 2). Knowing the location and 
frequencies of a target, in turn, allows a military force to disrupt the enemy, either in the 
electromagnetic spectrum, or physically (CRS, 2020). In response, the DOD intends to 
develop techniques to protect themselves by reducing RF signatures to decrease the 
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probability of detection, commonly referred to as low probability of detection (LPD)/low 
probability of intercept (LPI). LPI/LPD is desirable for its ability to make U.S. forces and 
their electromagnetic communications more difficult to disrupt, and as a force protection 
measure against conventional, kinetic attacks” (CRS, 2020).  
Low probability of incapacitation (LPI) and detection (LPD): the principal goal or 
function of a communication system to minimize the risk of interception and/or detection, 
respectively, of the communication transmission by anyone other than the intended 
recipient. LPI and LPD are referred to in this study as a singular concept (i.e., LPI/LPD) 
(Sklar, 2017). 
(2) Range 
Range of current communication systems present significant challenges while 
operating in the India Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). As 
noted, VHF and UHF have published theoretical ranges of 15–20 km and 45–50 km, 
respectively, over flat terrain. Due to their LOS requirements, VHF and UHF waveforms 
work over water and flat terrain, however, they are generally ineffective in dense, tropical 
vegetation and require relays or retransmission nodes to support communications over 
mountainous terrain, much of which makes the INDOPACOM AOR. These challenges are 
magnified while operating on island chains over medium to short distances as both VHF 
and UHF waveforms require users to extend elevated antennas above the canopy, or even 
employ relay/ retransmission nodes to support communications over vertical terrain to meet 
the LOS requirements. These additional resources increase potential identification by 
adversaries due to large physical footprints (i.e., large antenna pole or extra personnel 
which may not blend into the natural environment. Although VHF and UHF waveforms 
can be employed in an EABO environments, questions regarding their reliability make it 
not ideal for DMO in contested environments. 
(3) Satellite Communications 
Satellite communications (SATCOM) are better suited for DOD operations in the 
INDOPACOM AOR. Although SATCOM networks are LOS, their mobile antennas 
maintain a lower profile, and the relay/retransmission node is extra-terrestrial, which is 
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makes it difficult to detect by adversaries. Also, the data capacity of SATCOM network is 
larger than VHF and some UHF networks, which provides more robust capabilities for the 
DOD. However, the current demand within the DOD for SATCOM capabilities 
significantly outpaces the available resources, making it difficult to gain and maintain 
continuous access to SATCOM networks. Additionally, many SATCOM mobile terminals 
require a minimum of 5–10-watt power output to establish a reliable SATCOM link. 
Although relatively small for radio communications, the power requirements can create 
long term logistical challenges regarding power generation and sustainment while 
conducting EABO and DMO in the INDOPACOM AOR. To address these challenges, the 
researchers propose evaluating the potential employment of BSMN to alleviate the pressure 
and demand for limited SATCOM resources while providing a feasible resilient 
communication network for tactical units.  
c. Potential Bursty-Signal Modulation Solutions 
(1) Chirp Spread-Spectrum Modulation 
Chirp spread-spectrum (CSS) is a signal modulation technique that encapsulates 
information through the use of wideband frequency chirp pulses (IEEE, 2007). A chirp, or 
sweep signal, is a sinusoidal signal whose frequency increases or decreases over time; the 
rate at which the frequency changes is referred to as the chirp rate (IEEE, 2007). The carrier 
signals are resistant to detrimental effects, such as channel noise, in-band and out-of-band 
interferences, multipath fading, and Doppler effects within the mobile radio channel (IEEE, 
2007). These characteristics of are critical to resilient, effective, and efficient transmission 
of data of RF communication networks. CSS uses the entire, predetermined, bandwidth to 
broadcast a signal, making it robust to channel noise, resistant to multi-path fading even 
while operating at very low power relying on the linear nature of the chirp pulse. These 
advantages make CSS suitable for organizations which desire secure communication 
networks and resistance to noise, jamming, detection prevention, and low power 
requirements and have potential to serve as modulation techniques which support BSMNs.  
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(2) Long Range Frequency Modulation 
Long Range (LoRa) is a Semtech proprietary frequency modulation scheme and is 
considered a derivative of CSS which employs orthogonal spreading factors to exchange 
data rate for, sensitivity (signal-to-noise ratio [S/N]), signal efficiency, range, and power 
within a fixed channel bandwidth (Semtech, 2013). The physical layer is based on CSS 
modulation techniques using one or more channels for a given frequency band. LoRa itself 
is a Layer One implementation, however, when incorporated with the LoRa Wide Area 
Network (LoRaWAN), it interfaces with additional layers, with the potential and capability 
of implementation at all protocol layers (Semtech, 2013). This allows LoRa to 
communicate and operate with existing network architectures. LoRaWAN is the backbone 
of the CubeSat technology communication network which supports the low-power data 
transfer from nodes/endpoints via satellite communications to a network gateway. 
Although LoRa signal modulation requires LoRaWAN gateways for the execution of the 
mobile networks, this study evaluates the foundational modulation scheme as a potential 
concept which would support the employment of BSMNs (Semtech, 2013). 
5. Literature Summary 
Overall, the literature available to the authors was adequate for the narrow and 
preliminary nature of this study. However, the literature is ultimately inadequate for both 
developing a thorough understanding of the Navy and Marine Corps’ construct of DMO 
and EABO and the nature of C2 in these contexts, to the extent that other operating 
concepts and their C2 constructs are understood. Literature concerning DMO and EABO 
is limited because the concepts themselves, at the time of the conduct of this research, are 
still in development. Literature regarding C2 in EABO contexts was limited due both to 
the relative scarcity of exercises based on developing concepts, and due to a lack of access, 
as these documents are typically unpublished or classified. Furthermore, literature 
concerning BSMN was also limited due to the technology being relatively novel. The 
rectification of this study using more robust literature is included in the recommendations 
for future research. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Questions 
a. What are the optimal characteristics of the C2 structure for EABO, and how 
is this structure distinct from that of conventional operations?  
b. How does the EABO environment, as it relates to C2, create risks to force 
and mission?  
c. What potential technical capabilities are provided by a bursty-signal mesh 
network to support C2 infrastructures in EABO environments? Can these 
capabilities be feasibly applied to support EABO command, control, and 
communications’ frameworks?  
d. What potential operational capabilities are provided by employing bursty-
signal mesh network to support C2 infrastructures in EABO?  
e. What fiscal requirements are associated with supporting current command 
structure?  
f. What fiscal requirements and financial characteristic associated with 
development, procurement, implementation, and maintenance of a bursty-
signal mesh network to support C2 infrastructures in EABO environments?  
g. What is the cost-benefit analysis of employing a bursty-signal mesh 
network to support C2 infrastructures in EABO environments over current 
structures?  
2. Research Design 
This research is principally composed of three separate parts. The first part of this 
research consists of case studies of recent Marine Corps exercises in the EABO context. 
These case studies examine both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of C2. The 
researchers will use these case studies to establish conceptual and technical characteristics 
against which to assess the suitability of BSMN technology.  
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The second principal part of this research is a quantitative analysis, accomplished 
through conceptual technical modeling (i.e., conceptual modeling composed of technically 
derived data) (Tatomir et al., 2018). The researchers intend to use this modeling analysis 
to generate the theoretical quantitative data, including technical capabilities and 
limitations, which can be compared to the findings of the case studies: this comparison will 
indicate whether BSMN is theoretically suitable for use in support of C2 in EABO. 
The third principal part of this research is an analysis of the financial requirements 
of acquiring, developing, and deploying one CubeSat with one terrestrial, shore-based 
transceiver. Costs will initially be calculated based on the development of the software and 
hardware costs of developing the payload, space allocation on the transport vehicle, and 
launch requirements. This study will seek to determine the financial viability of developing 
and employing BSMNs using CubeSat technology in support of EABO. 
The final analysis of the research will compare the three principal studies: the 
requirements of the EABO construct identified in part one will be compared with the 
capabilities of the technology in question identified in part two; finally, the resulting 
suitability of the technology in question for future naval operations will be measured 
against the financial viability of its development and acquisition. The end-state of this 
research is to test the hypothesis: that bursty-signal mesh network technology is a suitable 
and viable solution for resilient communications in future naval operations. Figure 1 




Figure 1. Research Design Illustration 
3. Research Methods 
This study utilized a convergent parallel mixed method design, in which both 
qualitative and quantitative data is collected and analyzed separately, and then compared 
and interpreted (Creswell, 2014). This mixed methods study will ultimately be used to 
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evaluate the suitability of a BSMN in supporting C2 in EABO, and the financial viability 
of its procurement, development, and fielding to U.S. naval forces.  
The qualitative portion of this researchers consisted of case studies of recent Marine 
Corps exercises, with a focus on analyzing and characterizing the conceptual and technical 
aspects of C2 in an EABO context. In parallel, the researchers conducted a quantitative 
analysis BSMN technology through modeling in order to characterize the technical 
capabilities and limitations of BSMN technology. The results of these qualitative and 
quantitative analyses were then combined and compared in order to determine the 
suitability of BSMN technology for use in C2 systems for EABO.  
Finally, with the suitability of BSMN for C2 in EABO determined, the researchers 
conducted a quantitative financial cost-benefit analysis of BSMN in order to evaluate the 
viability of procuring, developing, and employing BSMN for EABO naval forces. 
E. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
1. Stakeholder Identification 
The stakeholders of this study were broadly identified as both DOD services and 
commercial industries. U.S. naval forces engaged in DMO, and U.S. Marine Corps forces 
engaged in EABO are the primary DOD service stakeholders for this study, though the 
applications of the hypothesized resilient, low power, and stealthy communications of 
BSMN have wide DOD application. Commercial industries which can develop and provide 
BSMN capabilities and services to the DOD are the commercial industry stakeholders. 
2. Stakeholder Needs 
Both DOD and industry stakeholders require an informed indication that BSMN is, 
or is not, a worthwhile technology to pursue for use in EABO. Such an indication would 
help to build a case for, or against, future investments of time and resources for developing 




Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD): the emergent techniques and technologies 
which seek to deny adversary maritime and littoral freedom of movement 
through the employment of long range, precision anti-ship missiles (HQMC, 
2021).  
Bandwidth: the difference between the greatest and lowest (i.e., range) of 
frequencies in the electromagnetic domain, measured in Hertz, available for 
use by a communication system, or by that system in a particular task 
(Cambridge University Press, n.d.). 
Bursty-Signal Mesh Network (BSMN): 
Bursty-signal: signals in which data is sent in relatively short, sudden 
timeframes (Cambridge, n.d.). 
Mesh network: a variety of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) in which nodes 
dynamically self-organize grants indiscriminate, high bandwidth access for a 
high quantity of users (McTasney et al., 2009, pp. 379–380). 
Command: the lawful authority afforded to a military commander to direct the 
actions of subordinates according to the commander’s rank and assignment 
(JCS, 2021). 
Command concept theory: first postulated in Command Concepts (Builder et 
al., 1999), and adopted by the researcher’s for the purpose of this study, 
command concept theory postulates that optimal command and control is 
characterized by three essential qualities: first, optimal command and control 
provides information necessary for a commander to build a clear pre-
conceived vision of the environment, the enemy, and their desired course of 
action in accomplishing a given mission; optimal command and control 
enables a commander to monitor and realize their vision in execution, and if 
their vision is incongruent with reality, to find and correct the faults in their 
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vision; and finally, optimal command and control systems sufficiently and 
exclusively transmit information relevant to build, convey, or alter the 
commander’s vision (Builder et al., 1999). 
Command and control (C2): the process by which a commander is made to 
understand a particular environment and enemy situation and directs 
subordinates to act to achieve the commander’s intent in accomplishing their 
mission (JCS, 2021; Builder et al., 1999). 
Command and control system: the sum of all people, physical objects, and 
intangible processes and procedures by which command and control is 
achieved (JCS, 2021). 
Digital divide: the recommended conceptual delineation in command and 
control, below which units bear a reduced burden to develop and transmit data 
rich messages and signals (3dMARDIV, 2019). 
Distributed Lethality (DL): the U.S. Navy’s organizational and operational 
principle of improving the individual lethality of all warships, distributing 
offensive capabilities over wider physical areas, and improving multi-domain 
force protection for naval forces. (COMNAVSURFOR, 2017) 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO): the emerging naval operating 
concept being developed in the continuum of the Distributed Lethality 
principle (CNO, 2018; Eyer & McJessy, 2019). 
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO): “the employment of 
mobile, low-signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain 
naval expeditionary forces from a series of austere, temporary locations 
ashore or inshore within a contested or potentially contested maritime area in 
order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment” 
(HQMC, 2021, pp. 1–3) 
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Information Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB): the analysis of the 
environment, enemy, time, and terrain in which military operations are 
anticipated. IPB methodology assists in defining the operational environment, 
describing the battlefield’s effect on friendly and enemy forces, evaluating the 
enemy threat, and determining potential enemy courses of action (HQMC, 
2021). 
Link Budget Equation: the equation used to estimate the quantitative factors 















44T (Sklar, 2017, p. 270).  
Littoral: the operational environment consisting of both seaward and landward 
components to the extent that they are operationally relevant to each other 
(i.e., the areas of the ocean that are within the operational reach of landward 
forces, and land that is conversely within the operational reach of seaward 
forces) (HQMC, 2021). 
Littoral Combat Team (LCT): the component of the MLR task-organized 
around an infantry battalion, with long-range anti-ship missile, aircraft 
forward arming and refueling, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance 
capabilities (Eckstein, 2020). 
Low probability of incapacitation (LPI) & detection (LPD): the principal goal 
or function of a communication system to minimize the risk of interception 
and/or detection, respectively, of the communication transmission by anyone 
other than the intended recipient. LPI and LPD are referred to in this study as 
a singular concept (i.e., LPI/LPD) (Sklar, 2017). 
Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR): the emergent naval expeditionary force 
formation based on ongoing Deputy Commandant for Combat Development 
and Integration (DC CD&I) analysis in support of DMO. The MLR could 
potentially require the principal reorganization of III MEF into task-organized 
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regimental-level formations suitable for DMO (CNO, 2020). Early iterations 
of the MLR are manned to 1,800 to 2,000 Marines (in contrast to the 3,400 
Marines of 3d Marine Regiment, for example) and consist of three principal 
components: the Littoral Combat Team, Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and 
Littoral Logistics Battalion (Eckstein, 2020). 
Maritime: “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the 
airspace above these, including the littorals” (HQMC, 2021, pp. F-6). See 
also: littorals. 
Mission command: the model/method of directing the actions of a force by 
communicating the commander’s intent and desired end-state, leaving 
subordinates to exercise creativity and initiative as to how precisely they will 
seek to achieve that intent. This contrasts with detailed command, which 
dictates explicit and precise instructions as to the actions of subordinates in 
pursuit of the commander’s intent. (See also: mission tactics and mission 
command and control) (HQMC, 2018). 
Node: a point in a communication network which serves either as a junction 
for network communication, or the destination of the network traffic (IBM 
Cloud Education, 2021).  
Throughput: the rate at which a communication system can transmit digital 
data, measured in bits per second (bits/s) (see also: data rate) (Sklar, 2017). 
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II. CASE STUDIES 
A. CASE STUDY ORIENTATION 
1. Case Study Purpose, Method, and End-State 
a. Purpose 
Evaluating the suitability of BSMN for C2 in EABO requires characterization 
EABO’s C2 qualities and features. By studying recent Marine Corps exercises related to 
and/or modeled after EABO, the researchers intend to characterize both its qualitative and 
quantitative factors as they relate to C2.  
b. Method 
To characterize the qualities and characteristics of C2 in the context of EABO, the 
researchers sought to analyze a sample set of exercises resembling EABO with a focus on 
C2. Due to access constraints, this study was limited solely to unclassified sources entirely 
available from the repository of AARs at the MCCLL website. Note: recommendation for 
future research (Chapter VI, Section C, Paragraph 1) address the potential for future 
research on the topic with more comprehensive material. 
c. Desired End-State 
The researchers sought to establish conceptual and technical criteria by which to 
evaluate the potential viability of BSMN technology for use in C2 for EABO. 
2. Case Study Design  
Scope. For the cases studied, the researchers examined C2 in EABO-related 
exercises under two distinct paradigms: conceptual and technical. While the overall 
purpose of the thesis study concerned BSMN’s viability as a technical solution to support 
C2 in EABO, the researchers contended that a wholistic evaluation of both conceptual and 
technical aspects of C2 was necessary. A comprehensive evaluation of C2 in EABO not 
only established if BSMN supports C2 as it is currently designed, but rather, if it supports 
C2 as it could, or should be designed. For example, if the existing C2 model requires digital 
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bandwidth and throughput to support a certain volume or type of information flow, but it 
is demonstrated that such a volume or type of information is not ultimately beneficial to 
the exercise of C2 in EABO, the researchers could more accurately assess the impact of 
BSMN’s ability or inability to support such communication. 
Selection Criteria. With the intent of evaluating C2 in a context as close as possible 
to that of anticipated EABO, the following criteria were used in selecting cases to study.  
• Timeframe: 2017-Present. The researchers sought cases recent enough to 
accurately reflect contemporary technology capabilities and requirements, 
and the publication of the EABO concept (COMNAVSURFOR, 2017; 
CMC, 2019; HQMC, 2021).  
• Environment: Pacific Littoral Environment. Cases were chosen which 
occurred, or were simulated to occur in, Pacific littoral environments similar 
to those anticipated in DMO (COMNAVSURFOR, 2017) to minimize 
potential environmental or physical variables.  
• Context: Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. Cases were chosen 
which explicitly reflect EABO in some capacity (COMNAVSURFOR, 
2017; CMC, 2019; HQMC, 2021). In particular, the researchers sought to 
study exercises in which participants were task-organized, physically 
distributed, and tasked to perform functions explicitly reflecting anticipated 
EABO. 
• Participants: United States Marine Corps Units. Cases in which U.S. Marine 
Corps units were the primary training audience were chosen in order to limit 
variables of communication technology, techniques, regulations, and 
policies, etc., from other services or nations.  
3. Selected Cases 
Due to time and resource constraints, the researchers limited the study to three 
cases. These cases spanned over two years and involved several Marine Corps units across 
I and III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), as well as U.S. 3d Fleet, and Army Special 
 
27 
Operating Forces (SOF). The cases selected provide a variation in the echelon of command 
and function of training audience, from the battalion to MEF level, as well as a variety of 
elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) (i.e., the Command Element, 
Ground Combat Element, Air Combat Element, and Logistics Combat Element). The 
following is a summary of the selected cases. 
• 1st Battalion, 6th Marines Exercise Northern Apache (July 2020). Exercise 
Northern Apache was a battalion-level force-on-force field exercise hosted 
by 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment from 13–19 July 2020 in Northern 
Training Area, Okinawa, Japan. Exercise Northern Apache was designed as 
an experiment in “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) employment 
concepts with similar capabilities outlined in the Marine Littoral Regiment 
(MLR) force design” specifically relating to tactical considerations for 
company-level operations (1/6, 2020, p. 1). This exercise incorporated a 
wide variety of fire support, intelligence, reconnaissance, special forces, 
logistics, and aviation units, and provides valuable insight into C2 at and 
below the battalion level.  
• III Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise (2019). III MEF’s Marine 
Expeditionary Force Exercise 2019 (MEFEX-19) provided an opportunity 
to examine a MEF-level simulation of C2 in an EABO context. MEFEX-19 
was hosted by the Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program 
(MSTP) in Okinawa, Japan from April 29 to 10 May 2019 (3dMARDIV, 
2019). This case provided insight into the type and nature of communication 
at the MEF level in the context of EABO operations. 
• I Marine Expeditionary Force & 3rd Fleet Joint Exercise Pacific Blitz 
(March 2019). The case of Exercise Pacific Blitz 2019 examined a 
MEF/Fleet level joint exercise in which Marine Corps and Navy forces 
worked in highly integrated teams to exercise various Expeditionary 
Advanced Base (EAB) concepts (1st Marine Division [1stMARDIV], 2019; 
Marine Aircraft Group 39 [MAG-39], 2019). This case provided valuable 
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insight into complications in unity of command associated with DMO’s 
joint construct (COMNAVSURFOR, 2017; CMC, 2019).  
4. Conceptual Study  
Definition of Conceptual Study. The conceptual study of C2 is defined herein as 
the study of abstract aspects of decision making and communication by which a military 
unit achieves C2 (HQMC, 2018): it includes the study of the mechanisms by which a 
commander can understand the situation at hand and influence subordinates to accomplish 
the commander’s will (e.g., task organization and chain of command, communication 
procedures, reporting requirements).  
Conceptual C2 Model. The researchers will conduct the conceptual C2 study using 
an adaptation of the theoretical model posited in a 1999 RAND Corporation study by 
Builder, Bankes, and Nordin, entitled Command Concepts—A Theory Derived from the 
Practice of Command and Control. This theoretical model for evaluating the conceptual 
aspects of C2 in military operations was chosen for use in this study because it both 
addresses the subject of conceptual C2 precisely and succinctly, and because it has 
previously been utilized as a valid and useful model for evaluating the subject matter by 
the Department of Defense (DOD).  
Command Concept Theory’s Foundations. Command Concepts (Builder et al., 
1999), and this study by extension, use the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms (JCS, 2021) definitions for command, command and control, and 
command and control systems: 
Command: 1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully 
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment….  
Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.  
Command and control system: The facilities, equipment, communications, 
procedures, and personnel essential for a commander to plan, direct, and 
control operations of forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (p. 40) 
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In this study, as in Command Concepts (1999), these definitions bear stating 
explicitly to point out that while C2 certainly has a crucial material aspect, it is arguably 
more of a conceptual, human endeavor, and is ultimately dependent on the cognition and 
motive force of the commander (Builder et al., 1999; Allard, 1996). Put differently, Weaver 
(1949) might recognize the ability of the commander to precisely express their meaning 
and the ability of subordinates to receive and act on that meaning (the Level B and Level 
C problems) as being equally important as the capability of a C2 system to faithfully 
transmit symbols (the Level A problem).  
In Command Concepts (1999), Builder et al. go even further in specifying the 
cognitive burden on the commander, and the timeframe in which that burden must be 
primarily carried: not only must a commander build clear visions of the environment, the 
enemy, and their own intentions for what is to be done, and communicate these visions 
clearly to subordinates; but further, all of these actions must take place well before the 
actual engagement with the enemy, and not immediately prior to or during the engagement. 
Thus, successful command concepts can be recognized by minimal communication traffic 
during the engagement with the enemy, as the commander’s intent is well understood and 
units are equipped to independently act upon it (Builder et al., 1999).  
5. Command Concept Theory  
Optimal C2 bears the following principal characteristics (Builder et al., 1999): 
• Commanders have a clear pre-conceived vision of the environment, the 
enemy, and what ought to be done about them. 
• Commanders are able to monitor the realization of their vision in execution, 
and if their vision is incongruent with reality, are able to find and correct 
the faults in their vision. 
• The C2 systems transmit only the information that is relevant to build, 
convey, or alter the commander’s vision. 
The researchers examined the conceptual C2 characteristics in each case in direct 
reference to each of these three principles, hereafter referred to as Command Concept 
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Theory. The researchers then drew key points and conclusions relative to this optimal C2 
model. Using this theory as a lens for this study, the researchers did not seek to scrutinize 
or second-guess the motivations or cognitive performance of the commander in each case. 
Rather, the researchers sought to simply understand each commander’s principal vision, 
the ability of the C2 construct in informing and reforming the vision, and the qualities of 
the information transmitted.  
The researchers suspected that this theory would prove profoundly useful in the 
broader evaluation of BSMN’s suitability for EABO, as it explicitly rejects the notion that 
the mere capability to transmit more information is necessarily better. Thus, by evaluating 
EABO exercises, the researchers could plausibly argue what information should be 
required in EABO, and then evaluate if BSMN would be suitable. 
Conceptual Study Metrics. In accordance with the three-point statement of 
Command Concept Theory above, the researchers developed the following metrics to 
measure the cases studied relative to an ideal C2 construct: 
Concerning the commander’s vision of the enemy and corresponding intent: 
• What was the commander’s pre-conceived understanding of the enemy’s 
disposition and intent? What signals/intelligence offered this 
understanding? 
• What was the commander’s intent in relation to the mission from higher and 
their understanding of the enemy? How was this intent communicated to 
subordinates? Was this intent reasonable given the forces and resources at 
hand? 
• What was the commander’s understanding of the environment in which 
their intent would be executed?  
Concerning the commander’s ability to and adjust the execution of their intent: 
• By what means did the commander monitor the execution of their intent, 
and did that apparatus provide the commander with sufficient and crucial 
information necessary to realize that intent in reality? 
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• Did indications of incongruity between the commander’s vision and reality 
presented themselves? How quickly and precisely was the commander 
made aware of these incongruities?  
• If an incongruity between the commander’s vision and reality presented 
itself, how did the commander react? If changes to their original intent were 
made, how did the commander communicate the new intent to 
subordinates?  
Concerning the C2 systems and the information transmitted:  
• What was the volume of communications passed during execution of the 
exercise relative to the volume of information passed prior to execution of 
the exercise? Was there any indication of insufficient or superfluous flow 
of information during the exercise?  
• What sort of information was transmitted during the exercise? Was the 
information passed during the exercise crucial in confirming or denying the 
commander’s original vision?  
• Were the C2 systems able to transmit information in sufficient fidelity to 
pass the meaning of the information accurately? Were there any indications 
that transmissions suffered meaningfully from a loss in fidelity?  
To note, while the researchers seek to answer all the questions posed above, insight 
into each question in not necessarily provided in each case. With the case material at hand, 
the researchers hope to be able to generally answer the questions posed in a cumulative 
manner. Future studies of more comprehensive material using these metrics is 
recommended at the end of this study. 
Special considerations for conceptual study case material. Studying training 
scenarios requires certain special considerations when compared to the study of real-life 
scenarios if Command Concepts (Builder et al., 1999).  
Real-World vs. Training Evaluation. Training scenarios are innately 
artificial, and these artificialities must be considered when evaluating the 
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nature of C2 in that exercise. For example, while understanding the 
“enemy” in a training scenario is no less important than, the enemy is 
inherently artificial and cannot truly reflect a real-world adversary due to 
safety and resource constraints. In these points of inherent artificiality, the 
researchers exercised their best judgement to extrapolate the point in 
question to its likely real-world effect. To note, the researchers originally 
intended to use the same ten-point metric for the cases as that found in 
Command Concepts (Builder et al., 1999), but the incongruities between 
training and real-world scenarios rendered the metrics incompatible. 
Case Resource Constraints. The specific cases in this study are derived from 
AARs, which are relatively incomprehensive when compared to the well 
documented cases in Command Concepts (Builder et al., 1999). The 
researchers examined the cases according to the determined criteria to the 
best of their ability but recommend further study with more robust 
documentation in this study’s conclusion.  
6. Technical Study  
Definition of Technical Study. Technical characteristics of C2 are defined herein 
as the quantitative, measurable aspects by which the military unit achieves command and 
control, particularly concerning communication via the electromagnetic spectrum (HQMC, 
1998a): it includes the physical factors of the communication system, including power 
output, transmission range, etc. These physical factors contribute to what Weaver (1949) 
might characterize as the level-A problem (i.e., the system’s capacity to accurately transmit 
communication symbols).  
Technical Study Metrics. The physical factors measured in the technical portion of 
these case studies were derived from elements of the link budget equation. The link budget 
equation is “a balance sheet of gains and losses” (Sklar, 2017, p. 243) to quantitatively 
estimate the overall effect of hardware, environment, and electromagnetism on the 
communication system (Sklar, 2017, p. 270). The specific expression of the link budget 
below pertains to digital systems, and accounts for the physical aspects of the transmitter 
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and receiver, the transmitting medium, and the means of encoding and modulation utilized 
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𝜂𝜂 = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟) 
𝑫𝑫 = 𝑨𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵 𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 (𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝒔𝒔) 
𝝀𝝀 = 𝑾𝑾𝑵𝑵𝑲𝑲𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 𝑵𝑵𝒐𝒐 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 (𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝒔𝒔) 
𝜶𝜶 = 𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒑𝒑𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔 𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝑱𝑱𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔 (𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 
𝝀𝝀 = 𝑾𝑾𝑵𝑵𝑲𝑲𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 𝑵𝑵𝒐𝒐 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 (𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝒔𝒔) 






= 𝑭𝑭𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒔𝒔𝒑𝒑𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 (𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 
𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰 = 𝒌𝒌𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑲𝑲𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔 (𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 




𝑮𝑮𝒓𝒓 =  𝑮𝑮𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔 𝑵𝑵𝒐𝒐 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑲𝑲𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓 (𝒓𝒓𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵) 
𝑇𝑇 = 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾) 
𝑮𝑮𝒓𝒓
𝑻𝑻
= 𝒌𝒌𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑲𝑲𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓 𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑲𝑲𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬 
The elements of the data link budget equation above (S. Tackett, PowerPoint Slides, 
October 2020) in ordinary type are those that are environmental or otherwise outside of the 
influence of the communicators: the elements in bold are variables within EABO forces’ 
influence to realistically effect.  
An additional variable of concern to digital mesh networks not otherwise named in 
the link budget equation is the number of nodes served in a communication system. A node 
is defined as a point in a communication network which serves either as a 
connection/conduit for that network’s communication (e.g., switches and routers), or as the 
terminal destination of the network traffic (e.g., a computer or phone) (IBM Cloud 
Education, 2021; Srivathsan et al., 2009, p. 225).  
Having defined the logical framework for the technical evaluation, the researchers 
sought to measure the following variables quantitatively in the cases studied in order to 
characterize the physical/technical characteristics of EABO as they occurred.  
• Maximum transmission range: what was the furthest range in which the 
exercise force communicated within the scenario? 
• Bandwidth and data rate requirement/constraint: based on the specific 
software and hardware systems used in the scenario, what was the 
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maximum bandwidth and data rate required and/or achievable by the 
exercise force? 
• Power requirement/constraint: how much power could the communication 
power sources at hand produce, or how much power was required to operate 
the most capable communication systems? 
• Antenna dimension requirement/constraint: based on both man-portable 
and ground vehicle-mounted communication assets, what is the maximum 
length of antenna EABO utilized in these scenarios? 
• Number of nodes served: approximately how many radios, computers, or 
other information systems were used in the communication network during 
these scenarios?  
Because much of the technical information sought was not immediately available 
or explicitly stated, some deduction and estimation is required, with the methods for that 
deduction noted in the table. Further research with precise historical data from EABO 
exercises could better characterize these technical aspects of C2 in EABO.  
B. CASE STUDIES 
1. 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment: Exercise Northern Apache 2020 
a. Summary of Events 
From 13 to 19 July 2020, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (1/6) planned and 
executed Exercise Northern Apache (1/6, 2020), a battalion-level force-on-force field 
exercise aboard the Northern Training Area of Okinawa, Japan. The exercise was designed 
as an experiment in company-level EABO concepts and techniques, with battalion-level 
goals of refining the battalion C2 standard operating procedures, thus establishing best 
practices for EABO exercise design and control and provide higher feedback regarding 
MLR design (1/6, 2020). The training audience for this exercise consisted of Joint Forces 





• Headquarters Company, 1/6 
• Fire Direction Center (FDC), 3d Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment (3/12)  
• Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC), 3d Reconnaissance Battalion (3d 
Recon). 
• Company A, 1/6 
• Motorized Section, Heavy Machine Platoon, Weapons Company, 1/6 
• Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 1125, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces 
Group (SFG) 
• A section of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), 3/12 (i.e., (1) 
HIMARS launcher with crew) 
• 4th Platoon, Company A, 3d Recon 
• Combat Logistics Detachment (CLD), 3d Transportation Support Battalion (3d 
TSB) 
• 3d MEF Information Group (MIG) Ground Sensor Platoon (GSP) 
• Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron-265 (VMM)  
The adversary force for this exercise consisted of the Anti-Armor Platoon, 1/6, and 
4th Platoon, Company B, 3d Recon. 
b. Conceptual Study 
(1) The Commander’s Vision  
The Exercise Northern Apache Road-to-War (RTW) brief, provided as an 
addendum to the AAR (1/6, 2020, pp. 26–76) is an example of the quality of intelligence 
that was available to the battalion and company commanders, and appeared to the 
researchers to be a reasonably realistic resource from which to build the respective 
commanders’ visions of the enemy and environment. Specifically, background information 
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on current events with the notional enemy on a broader strategic scale and recent 
operational-level intelligence of enemy actions in the region were sufficient to build a 
vision of the lower-level enemy’s intent in the immediate fight. The researchers found the 
artificial enemy scenario to be realistically presented, with fidelity similar to that of RTWs 
experienced during real-world military operations. The source of the information in the 
RTW was not explicitly stated, but the researchers assumed that strategic-level intelligence 
services would be required to collect and process this information.  
During the exercise, intelligence of the enemy’s tactical disposition was provided 
by the Marines from 3d Recon (supporting both Company A and 1/6 Battalion HQ), GSP, 
and 1125th ODA Soldiers, in addition to reports from the force’s maneuver elements (1/6, 
2020). Overall, the intelligence apparatus would seem to be sufficient for the task at hand 
at the company level, though the battalion (and company, to a lesser degree) would also 
likely have an additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability in 
a real-world scenario.  
In the exercise warning order (1/6, 2020, p. 12), the exercise force was given an 
explicit statement of their higher commander’s intent. Furthermore, while there was not a 
full operation order (OPORD) from this notional higher commander available to 
researchers in this case, the researchers assert that the exercise force likely executed the 
training scenario from OPORDs from respective higher commanders: it is highly unlikely 
that a real-world scenario like this would be executed without detailed and explicit orders, 
confirmation briefs, and rehearsals (CNO, 2018). Specifically, in this case, the exercise 
force was informed that the higher notional commander’s intent was to deny the enemy use 
of the islands that constituted the exercise force’s area of operations (AO) as their EAB, 
and ultimately to degrade the enemy’s ability to influence the notional allied nation’s 
territorial waters. This scenario’s context and the commander’s intent are plausible, though 
the size of the enemy force opposing the EAB force is questionable. By the researchers’ 
estimation, an enemy platoon-sized element, alone on an EAB, may be smaller than what 
would likely be encountered in real life. 
Regarding the communication of the intent, however, there appeared to be 
deficiencies during Exercise Northern Apache (1/6, 2020, p. 3). While the intent of the 
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commander, generally, was simple and appeared to have been well understood, the intent 
for the internal structure of the exercise force and in what manner it would operate 
(e.g., what the internal responsibilities for support were) were unclear. While the concept 
of the MLR was referenced in the 1/6 AAR (1/6, 2020), the command and support 
relationships within the MLR for the performance of essential warfighting functions 
(e.g., logistics, fires) were not clear to the exercise force. Specifically, the operating force 
was unclear about: who commanded the EAB, and whom the EAB supports; what forces 
necessarily constitute the EAB; where the EAB’s logistical support lies; and who has the 
authority concerning essential EAB functions (tasking authority of sensors, fires approval, 
etc.). The Exercise Northern Apache AAR recommends the refinement of the basic 
structure of the EAB and the manner in which EABs fit into EABO, and DMO in general 
(1/6, 2020). In addition to the recommendation that Headquarters Marine Corps continue 
to develop, refine, and solidify the MLR construct, the researchers assert that the 
commander in this case could have reasonably made the intent for the inner workings of 
the organization known well before the execution of the exercise. The researchers offer this 
observation with the obvious caveat that EABO and the MLR are concepts in development, 
and that some lack of precision regarding particular information like task organization is 
to be expected.  
This exercise scenario provided a realistic and largely sufficient evaluation of the 
environment in which the exercise force would operate (DON, 2020a, p. 27). As a doctrinal 
step in preparatory planning, the exercise force produced an Information Preparation of the 
Battlespace (IPB) report, which among other things, defines the operational environment 
and describes the battlespace effects (DON, 2018b, p. 2–2). That is, the 1/6 battalion staff 
evaluated such physical aspects of the environment as terrain, vegetation, meteorological 
forecasts, avenues for vehicle traffic, clearings for use as airfields, etc. The IPB further 
describes how the environment will affect operations and evaluates which terrain is key to 
the operation (DON, 2020a). The understanding of the terrain given in this exercise is 
derived from geospatial sources (e.g., satellite imagery) and ground-level intelligence: both 
the sources and quality of information about the environment are realistic and plausible 
relative to a real-world scenario as experienced by the researchers. The only thing missing 
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from the evaluation of the environment is an assessment of the disposition of the local 
population and infrastructure: the absence of this information is likely due to the intentional 
limitation of the scope of the exercise (i.e., no civilian population was depicted in this 
scenario). Thus, the researchers would not attribute this to absence in the IPB to a 
deficiency in planning or intelligence resources. 
(2) Execution of the Commander’s Vision  
In this scenario, as is generally the case, the commander was made aware of events 
on the battlefield through reporting from sources organic to the task organization of the 
unit. Specifically, reports came from both the supporting reconnaissance, intelligence, and 
SOF elements, and the maneuver forces themselves. While there was no indication that 
maneuver or intelligence forces failed to provide the commander with sufficient 
information concerning the execution of their intent, the exercise AAR did state that both 
organizational and technical communication shortfalls prevented information from 
reaching the commander in a timely or complete manner (1/6, 2020, p. 9). Some re-
organization of support units (i.e., moving the GSP monitoring station into the Company 
Command Operations Center (COC)) was necessary to overcome technical limitations and 
streamline the process by which the commander and higher headquarters understood the 
environment, with some success. To this point, the exercise force described the available 
communication systems (High Frequency Tactical Chat [HF TAC Chat]) as wholly 
inadequate for transmitting information to confirm or deny the commander’s intent during 
execution. Specifically, there were not an appropriate number of nets to support separate 
functions per Marine Corps communication doctrine (i.e., intelligence reports had to be 
sent over the battalion tactical direction net instead of the doctrinal intelligence net) (1/6, 
2020, p. 9; HQMC, 1998a). The exercise force further asserted that, even if satellite 
communications (SATCOM) were available, there were insufficient quantities of 
SATCOM assets (PRC-117Gs) and access to support anything more than the battalion 
headquarters (HQ) element and a single EAB (1/6, 2020, p. 9).  
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(3) The C2 Systems and Information Transmitted  
While the previously identified deficiency in communication resources carries a 
negative connotation, this point illustrates a positive aspect of C2 in Northern Apache: the 
exercise force appeared to the researchers to be ultimately successful in their principal 
objective of taking and holding the EAB while suffering from constraints in the 
communication volume between the company and battalion. This indicates that the 
battalion commander’s C2 construct did not suffer from superfluous communication 
volume. While the Northern Apache AAR (1/6, 2020) indicated the desire for higher 
communication volume between battalion and company elements in order to achieve 
doctrinal communication standards, the apparent success of the exercise brings into 
question the need for such higher volume of communications.  
With HF TAC Chat named as a primary means of communicating between the 
company and the battalion, simple plain text appeared to be the primary type of 
transmission by which the battalion commander confirmed and altered their intent in this 
exercise. While not specifically stated, it is presumed that VHF communications were 
utilized at the company level. In the AAR for Exercise Northern Apache (1/6, 2020), and 
while relegated primarily to text in HF TAC Chat, there were no indications that the 
medium lacked fidelity in transmitting information to and from the battalion commander. 
(4) Key Conceptual C2 Observations 
Sustain MAGTF-style task organization at battalion level. Task organization and 
distribution of authorities and responsibilities requires further refinement. Because of the 
explicit emphasis on tempo in seizing and displacing from EABs, and the wide physical 
displacement of EABs per the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CMC, 2019), the 
researchers recommend a task organization for battalions and below similar to 1/6’s in this 
exercise, with a complete MAGTF-like construct (i.e., a command, ground, air, and 
logistics capability) and authorities to utilize all assets at hand as it relates to operating 
EABs and conducting A2AD. Doing so will further alleviate the burden and hazards 
associated with long range communications. The greatest challenge to this 
recommendation will likely come from resource constraints in logistical and aerial assets.  
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Decentralize EAB fire support authority. Authority to use resources, and 
particularly fire support assets, should be vested in the lowest level in which each 
respective echelon of forces is expected to influence. This means the HIMARS, and aerial 
fire support assets needed to mutually support EABs and conduct A2AD should have 
approval authority vested at the battalion or regimental level, as opposed to the division 
level as in previous operations in the Middle East. Company EAB forces should continue 
to maintain authority to coordinate fires organic to the EAB force, such as mortars and 
apportioned Close Air Support (CAS) affecting targets within the EAB’s immediate 
vicinity. 
Battalion EABO operations require more plentiful, low power, stealthy 
communications. Throughout Exercise Northern Apache, the requirement for resilient, 
stealthy, and long-range communications first identified in the 38th Commandant’s 
Planning Guidance (CMC, 2019) is echoed at the tactical level. Given the principle that 
optimal C2 requires minimal communication during execution (Builder et al., 1999), the 
researchers contend that the information that confirms or denies the commander’s vision 
during execution should be streamlined to its minimal form, and potentially to the size and 
volume supported by existing high frequency (HF) assets. What cannot be contended, 
however, is the lack of capacity for doctrinal communication nets that the exercise force 
identified (HQMC, 1998a). Further research using documentation indicating how many 
different nets were used during this type of exercise could illuminate how many nets 
BSMN might need to support.  
c. Technical Study 
Table 2 summarizes key technical aspects of C2 as observed or surmised from 





Table 2. Exercise Northern Apache Technical Characteristics 




30 mi (48 km) 
VHF communications unable to range 
battalion-to-EAB communications: HF and 






BW: < 60 MHz 
 
DR: < 9.6 kbps 
Voice and/or HF TAC Chat and similar simple 
text protocols characterize the type of message 
traffic observed, and the bandwidth and data-
rate benchmark. Bandwidth and data rate are 
based off advertised PRC-150 HF Radio 





Vehicle: 50 W 
Man-pack: 20 W 
Power requirements are consistent with those of 
typical, currently issued equipment. Minimal 
power requirement is explicitly named as a 
priority due to logistical constraints (1/6, 2020, 
p. 4). 
Vehicle-power for issued radios 
(e.g., AN/VRC-103(v2) for PRC-
150 and PRC-117G) (Harris, 2007). 
BA-5590/BB-2590 Batteries for 
man-packed communications 
systems. Between 10–20 Watts in 
1dB increments is listed as the 









Vehicle: < 32 ft  
Man-pack: < 35 ft  
Vehicle mounted and man-packed radio 
systems typical to ground combat element 
Tables of Equipment (T/E) characterize the 
antenna size limitations in this case’s EAB. 
Vehicle mounted antenna size is based on the 
current mountable whip antennas (Harris, 
2007); man-portable radio antenna maximum 
size is based on the current OE-254 Antenna 




40 ≤ x ≤ 121 nodes 
Per estimations made in similar Mobile Ad hoc 
Network (MANET) research (Nicholas et al., 
2013), there can be as few as 40 and as many as 
121 nodes in an infantry battalion. While this is 
clearly over estimation for this case, with a 
single company and battalion headquarters, the 
addition of the overall task force elements leads 
the researchers to estimate that this estimation 
is valid, though approximate, for the force at 
hand. To note, the research by Nicholas et al. is 
based on the echelons of leadership between the 
battalion commander and infantry fire team 
leader level (2013): future research can better 
approximate the number of radio nodes for this 
scenario by using a current table of equipment 
(T/E), which was not available to the 
researchers in this case.  
 
While the technical burden on communications would appear to be light and 
resulted, arguably, in sufficient C2 for the execution of the mission, the need for logistically 
modest and spectrally stealthy communications was emphasized in the Exercise Northern 
Apache AAR (1/6, 2020). Furthermore, the lack of channels with which to control and 
monitor doctrinal communications nets should also be observed as a deficiency in the 
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number of nodes operating: this precise sort of deficiency in scalability makes BSMN a 
compelling technical solution for C2 in EABO, should BSMN prove effective (Bordetsky 
et al., 2014). 
d. Conclusion 
Exercise Northern Apache, while relatively small in scale compared to other cases 
in this study, provided valuable insight into the unique considerations and challenges faced 
by the lowest tactical-level warfighters in EABO. The observations made in this case 
reinforce the need for the development of communication capabilities that are stealthy  
(i.e., low probability of detection and intercept), and that are sensitive to the relatively 
limited logistical and sustainment capabilities of EAB forces (i.e., low power requirement) 
(1/6, 2020). 
While Exercise Northern Apache was explicitly intended to serve as a testbed for 
battalion level C2 and EAB operations (1/6, 2020), the researchers believe that the task-
organization of the EAB forces is sound, with the potential need for additional enablers, 
like an engineer support element. As previously concluded in the conceptual study, once 
the task-organization is solidified, the researchers recommend that all authorities for such 
activities as fire support be vested in the lowest level possible to minimize the burden and 
hazards of long-range communication, and to increase operational tempo in accordance 
with the principles of mission command (HQMC, 2018): such decentralization of authority 
will require training and deliberate emphasis on understanding of the higher commander’s 
intent prior to the commencement of hostile engagement with the enemy (Builder et al., 
1999). 
2. III Marine Expeditionary Force: Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise 
2019  
a. Summary of Events 
From 26 April to 10 May 2019, the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) 
hosted MEFEX-19 at Marine Corps Base Butler in Okinawa, Japan (3dMARDIV, 2019). 
MEFEX-19 served as a rehearsal of MEF-level amphibious operations (MASS-6, 2019) 
with III MEF as the primary training audience and major subordinate units in supporting 
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roles. Because MEFEX-19 was a simulated exercise (3dMARDIV, 2019), little insight is 
offered in the way of real-world communications. This case does, however, provide 
valuable insight into the nature and substance of information in MEF-level EABO. 
b. Conceptual Study 
(1) The Commander’s Vision 
In terms of the commander’s vision of the enemy, understanding of the 
environment, and vision for action, the documentation for this case offers little insight. The 
one aspect of the pre-fight vision that is clear, however, is the commander’s intent for their 
organization at the top level to be tightly integrated: this vision was manifested in the 
extensive and effective use of liaison officers (LNOs) between the III MEF staff and 
subordinate/supporting units. LNOs were exchanged, reciprocally, between MEF 
headquarters, 3d Marine Division (MARDIV), 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW), 3d 
Marine Logistic Group (3d MLG), the MEF Information Group (MIG) Detachment, and 
the Civil Military Operations detachments (3dMARDIV, 2019). Further socialization of 
LNOs across subordinate organizations also proved key to a mutual understanding of the 
enemy, environment, and the means to achieving the commander’s vision, particularly in 
the case of the integration of MIG and fire support organizations (3dMARDIV, 2019, 
p. 11). Such a vision for the integration of the force was a valuable point to take away from 
this case. 
(2) Execution of the Commander’s Vision. 
The question of which information, and in what form, was used to update the 
commanders about the state of the battle and the condition of their visions was addressed 
by 3dMARDIV with an observation about the digital communications, and audio-visual 
information, specifically (3dMARDIV, 2019). While some forms of digital 
communications are rich in information and formatted for ease of use by the consumer, 
such productions can also be both time consuming and resource intensive to make and 
transmit.  Furthermore, the communication apparatus needed to transmit resource intensive 
digital information often requires static command posts with robust antennas and power 
resources (3dMARDIV, 2019). Thus, 3dMARDIV recommended a delineation between 
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the level of commands that can and cannot sustain the requirements for audio-visual 
information: they call this limit the “digital divide” (3dMARDIV, 2019, p. 2). Defining the 
digital divide could help to temper expectations for digital communication and products 
and shape the way in which the higher headquarters expects to understand the environment. 
Due to the constant maneuver of regimental-level units/task forces in MEFEX-19, 
3dMARDIV ultimately recommended that the digital divide lie between the regimental and 
division level (3dMARDIV, 2019, p. 2). This delineation would relieve 3dMARDIV’s 
subordinate units from the burden of digital C2 productions and transmissions.  
(3) The C2 Systems and Information Transmitted 
In an effort to build the commander’s situational awareness, 3dMARDIV staff 
recognized a superfluous volume of MEF Priority Information Requests (PIRs), to the point 
that the requests came to resemble Requests for Information (RFIs) more closely in their 
broad and numerous nature (3dMARDIV, 2019). The observation that information 
requirements, deemed critical by the higher commander/staff, appeared to lack focus 
indicates that exactly which information is critical is either ill-defined or unknown. 
Additional consideration and guidance from the commander may be required to simply 
identify and communicate what information is critical for confirming and modifying the 
commander’s vision to its absolutely essential elements.  
While an abbreviated list of the types of software and communications systems that 
were utilized in MEFEX-19 is located in the technical portion of this case study, one 
application of interest, due to its high digital resource requirement, was Secure Video 
Teleconference (SVTC) (3dMARDIV, 2019; Defense Information Systems Agency 
[DISA], 2014, p. 15). 3dMARDIV staff recognized the need for a robust SVTC capability 
and recommended the development of the capacity to support several SVTC stations 
simultaneously (3dMARDIV, 2019). Per the AAR comments from 3dMARDIV, the value 
of face-to-face communications at and above the division level is considered one of the 
more potent, if technologically burdensome, means of communicating the commander’s 
vision and making the commander aware of how their vision is playing out in reality.  
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(4) Key Conceptual Observations 
Emphasis on the importance of LNOs. The recognition of the importance of LNOs 
in enabling C2 in the case of MEFEX-19 is in alignment with the principles of Command 
Concept Theory, namely, that the bulk of communication must happen before the 
engagement, and that a successful C2 construct is evident by minimizing information that 
must be passed during the engagement. In the case of LNOs, this early and intrinsic 
communication is achieved through the organic placement of individuals with relevant 
information. The researchers second the motion that LNOs be used to the greatest degree 
possible, both vertically and horizontally in the EABO task organization. 
The digital divide. The digital divide’s principal reduction of burden, both on the 
time and effort of units below the division level, and on their communication and logistical 
resources, is considered by the researchers to be a valid recommendation that is aligned 
with Command Concept Theory (3dMARDIV, 2019; Builder et al., 1999): the researchers 
will adopt this recommendation for an optimal EABO C2 design. 
UAS as C2 enabling nodes. A point of this case not previously addressed indicated 
the exercise force’s desire to utilize unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as retransmission 
nodes for C2: resources for retransmission sites required during MEFEX-19 were 
recognized as lacking, and specifically, the manpower required to safeguard retransmission 
sites was a limiting factor (3dMARDIV, 2019). UAS retransmission capabilities were 
posited to establish retransmission nodes without requiring manpower to maintain security 
around that node. To the researchers, the inclusion of UAS retransmission nodes indicated 
a need for a communication system that is scalable and dynamic: both these qualities are 
advertised benefits of mesh networks (Srivathsan et al., 2009), which the researchers will 
seek to evaluate in BSMN. 
c. Technical Study 
Table 3 summarizes key technical aspects of C2 as observed or surmised from 




Table 3. MEFEX-19 Technical Characteristics 






3d MEF and 7th Communication Battalion tested the 
Free Space Optics (FSO) IR communication system 
at a range of approximately 1 km (Camp Hansen to 
Camp Courtney (3dMARDIV, 2019; Valero & 
Kindo, 2018). The desire to achieve distances of 15 
km was expressed, as well. 
Given the simulated nature of this exercise, these 
distances are not considered to accurately reflect 






DR: 1 Gbps 
FSO averaged data rates of 30 Mbps, with 70 Mbps 
peaks. Other services, like Cypher Block Systems 
(CBS), were recommended to upgrade to a 1 Gbps 
capacity (3dMARDIV, 2019). 
Bandwidth and data rates were required to utilize the 
following programs: MCEN services (NIPR and 
SIPR); VOIP; SQL; SolarWinds; Openfire (XMPP 
Chat); SharePoint; Wave/TRICS; JADOCS; C2PC 
Gateway; CLC2S; TCPT; Transverse; VLC; and 





Power to communications systems is deemed 
unconstrained due to the infrastructural and 
expeditionary resources available to operation 





113ft (34.7 m)  
MEF level forces are presumed to have a more 
robust antenna-size capacity than EABs: estimations 
are based on dimensions of TEAMS antenna 
(Contact Corporation, n.d.). 
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There were an estimated 1,500 users across all 
platforms and functions of enterprise services at the 
division level during MEFEX-19 (3dMARDIV, 
2019; MASS-6, 2019). While the researchers 
assume that the MEF-level would have a greater 
number of functions served, they also draw a 
distinction between platforms served and nodes 
required to establish a link between distinct units 
and locations. Further study is required to determine 




This case, while a simulation, provided valuable insight into the type of information 
that is appropriate for each echelon of command, particularly above the division level. This 
study is a prime example of the balance that must be struck between an organization’s 
appetite for communication that aids in C2 (e.g., SVTC), and the need to limit 
communication in pursuit of mission command principles. The difficulty in this case to 
clearly define priority information suggests that the force requires focus on the disciplined 
streamlining of information at this level of warfare, rather than merely adding technological 
C2 capacities. 
3. I Marine Expeditionary Force & U.S. 3rd Fleet: Exercise Pacific Blitz 
2019 
a. Summary of Events 
From 25 February to 11 April 2019, I MEF, U.S. 3rd Fleet, and major subordinate 
units conducted Exercise Pacific Blitz 2019 (PB-19). The objective of PB-19 was to 
integrate Navy and Marine Corps teams, and exercise C2 over both maritime and 
amphibious forces engaged in “Advanced Naval Base Operations,” which the researchers 
interpret to be synonymous with EABO (1stMARDIV, 2019, p. 1). The exercise force, 
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task-organized into a Littoral Combat Force (LCF) with aviation combat element (MAG-
29), ground combat element (1stMARDIV), and maritime combat element (3d 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG-3)), established four uniquely tasked EABs ashore with 
MEF-level support (MAG-39, 2019). This case provided valuable insight into the 
particulars of current task organization issues within the LCF (MAG-39, 2019) and above, 
as well as C2 related to Joint Navy and Marine Corps operations (Fuentes, 2019). 
b. Conceptual Study 
(1) The Commander’s Vision 
The researchers assert that this case is most valuable for its illustration of the 
dynamic of task organization and its effect on the actualization of the commander’s vision. 
All other things being equal, the manner in which a military unit is organized can alter its 
effective resources, tempo, and potency (HQMC, 2018). Several different AAR points 
suggest that PB-19’s force structure suffered from a lack of unity and clear lines of 
authority, which ultimately inhibited the execution of the commander’s vision. 
Even prior to the execution of the commander’s vision in PB-19, 1stMARDIV Staff 
Judge Advocates identified the benefit of adding a law enforcement capability to EABO 
task organizations, as this provides the commander with additional options in creating and 
achieving a vision for action. As DMO will require Navy and Marine Corps forces to 
interact with “nontraditional naval forces or flagless vessels” (1stMARDIV, 2019, p. 11), 
the addition of a maritime law enforcement capability through a Coast Guard element could 
be useful in DMO operations, particularly in regarding to abiding by and leveraging 
international law.  
Several references indicate that the commander’s vision of the environment was 
derived through the ordinary IPB process (CNO, 2018; 1stMARDIV, 2019). However, 
1stMARDIV staff were critical of the IPB provided, and the lack of focus on domains other 
than physical (e.g., the cultural domain): a key source of this insufficiency was a stated 
failure to integrate all intelligence assets across the Navy and Marine Corps team. This 
point further emphasizes the need for Navy and Marine Corps unity of effort, at the highest 
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levels as well as the lowest, which includes the pooling of resources and sharing of data 
(1stMARDIV, 2019). 
(2) Execution of the Commander’s Vision 
Along with ordinary reporting (presumed by the researchers, as there is little insight 
into this in the source material), the 1stMARDIV AAR (1stMARDIV, 2019) identified a 
missed opportunity for the use of I MEF Communications Strategy & Operations 
(COMMSTRAT) to provide the commander the division and fleet commanders with an 
audio-visual representation of current events from the EABs. In the case of this exercise, 
this data was collected and disseminated, but only after the data was physically returned to 
the commanders’ location, and not in real time. 1stMARDIV staff suggested the Mobile 
User Objective System (MUOS), which was able to transmit data to and from naval vessels 
at a rate of 3 MBps, as a solution to allow for this real-time visual information transfer. 
However, the researchers question the necessity of real-time audio-visual information to 
confirm the commander’s vision at-and-above the division level, particularly considering 
the burden it would place on communication systems: the researchers recommend further 
study in this regard. 
Some incongruities between the commander’s vision and reality were manifested 
in the inner workings of the commander’s organization, particularly regarding authorities. 
One such example at the highest levels of the PB-19 exercise was recognized by 
participants from 1stMARDIV (1stMARDIV, 2019): several principal channels existed 
between the Navy and Marine Corps forces for the tactical tasking of aircraft, including 
Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) and Navy Daily Intention 
Messages (DIMs). This sentiment was brought forward by MAG-39, which served as an 
attached Air Combat Element (ACE) to the LCF: because the Task Elements (TE) charged 
with the principle task of establishing EABs were subordinate to the LCF, and some EAB 
tasks were predominantly ACE missions (e.g., establishing and executing forward air 
refueling points), the ability of MAG-39 to task TEs was inhibited, and instead, MAG-39 
had to work through the LCF (MAG-39, 2019).  
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Regarding all TEs, not just those concerning the ACE, 1stMARDIV recognized 
that they maintained too much centralized control, as they became the primary planners of 
tactical tasks that should be the domain of MLRs, LTC or even the EAB forces themselves 
(e.g., planning forward arming and refueling FARPs, HIMARS sites, etc.) (1stMARDIV, 
2019). This is an indication that mission command is not being properly exercised, but 
rather, higher commands are micro-managing subordinate operations. As the AAR 
suggests, this could have been an artificiality of the training scenario as MLRs (along with 
subordinate Littoral Combat Teams (LCTs) and EAB) were not fully staffed or represented, 
but still indicates that tactical direction of EABs needs to be the domain of units below the 
division level.  
Upon later receipt and review of the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced 
Base Operations (HQMC, 2021), the problem of task organization and authority for 
aviation-related units and capabilities is addressed through the integration of aviation 
capabilities into the force, specifically, the Littoral Logistics Battalion (LLB) as it relates 
to establishing and running the FARP. It appears to the researchers that some of the issues 
experienced in this exercise as it relates to aviation capabilities may have been mitigated 
in a real-life operation through the existence and support of the LLB, which was beyond 
the scope and/or capacity of PB-19. Further research is recommended to confirm this 
assumption. 
(3) The C2 Systems and Information Transmitted 
While the volume of communications themselves is not addressed directly in the 
case material for PB-19, certain AAR points further reinforced both the need for low 
probability of interception/detection (LPI/LPD) communication technology, and the 
exercise of mission type orders as the primary means of communicating the commander’s 
intent (vice continuous and immediate directions from the higher commander) 
(1stMARDIV, 2019). Denial of communications was a point of concern in the 38th 
Commandant’s Planning Guidance (2019): an evaluation of the exercise force’s electronic 
protection procedures by an Electronic Warfare Support Team identified vulnerability in 
this exact regard, and specifically the denial of UHF satellite communications.  
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(4) Key Conceptual Observations 
Increase emphasis on joint unity of command and inter-force coordination of 
resources. Unity of command between Navy and Marine Corps units, and internally to 
Marine Corps units, is a consistently addressed issue (1stMARDIV, 2019). Fully integrated 
and/or organic ACE forces within the appropriate elements of the MLR, rather than as an 
attachment to the LCF, could assist in establishing a clear line of authority and tasking. 
The researchers recommend exploring options for a more unified command of the LCF and 
MLR, like a single commander of the ground, maritime, and air elements under a LCF 
command element similar to the MAGTF construct (HQMC, 1998b). The management of 
warfighting resources, like intelligence apparatus, may also be improved through their 
consolidation under a unified command structure. Regarding joint command, the addition 
of U.S. Coast Guard elements to the LCF can provide capabilities below the threshold of 
violence and with non-combatant interactions. 
Mission type orders and execution. An earlier observation reinforced the need for 
LPI/LPD communication technology in response to potential enemy communication denial 
attacks. While a technological solution that would allow for continuous and discrete 
communications is clearly desirable, Builder et al. (1999) asserted that successful C2 is 
characterized by minimal communication during execution. In other words, the intent of 
the commander, optimally communicated, rehearsed, and resourced prior to execution 
would require no additional direction to subordinates during execution (Builder et al., 1999, 
p. xvi). In terms of the manner in which the commander’s vision is communicated, the 
circumstances and hazards of denied communication in the EABO place additional 
emphasis on the prior communication and understanding of the commander’s vision, and 
the proper resourcing and empowering of subordinates to carry out that vision absent of 
the commander’s constant direction. Such a reinvigoration of mission command could 




c. Technical Study 
Table 4 summarizes key technical aspects of C2 as observed or surmised from PB-
19. The real-execution of EABO with a division-level force provided valuable technical 
data for both the higher headquarters and EAB forces within the broader EABO context 
(1stMARDIV, 2019).  
Table 4. Exercise Pacific Blitz Technical Characteristics 





Liberal estimations of maximum ranges are based 
on the following reported participant locations for 
PB-19 (Fuentes, 2019): 
• Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton  
• Marine Corps Air Station Miramar 
• Naval Air Station Point Mugu 
• Naval Surface Warfighting Center Port 
Hueneme 






Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 
transmitted imagery at 3 MBps (1stMARDIV, 
2019). 
Services used between Marine and Navy forces 
included MCEN (13 NIPR & 9 SIPR servers), 
MUOS, VOIP, (3dMARDIV, 2019; MASS-6, 
2019; 1stMARDIV, 2019; 9th Communications 
Battalion [9th Comm], 2019) 
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Vehicle: 50 W 
Man-pack: 20 W  
Power to communications systems at the MEF and 
division levels is deemed unconstrained due to 
their infrastructural and expeditionary power 
resources. Power constraints for EABs are based 
on typical issued vehicle and man-portable 
communication power sources: 
• Vehicle-power for issued radios (e.g., 
AN/VRC-103(v2) for PRC-150 and PRC-
117G) (Harris, 2007) 
• BA-5590/BB-2590 Batteries for man-packed 





113ft (34.7 m)  
MEF level forces are presumed to have a more 
robust antenna-size capacity than EABs: 
estimations are based on dimensions of TEAMS 




Unknown Researchers were unable to estimate the number of 
nodes used in PB-19.  
 
d. Conclusion 
Exercise PB-19 provided the most insight out of any case reviewed into the internal 
mechanics that will be required for EABO, with the key lessons summarized in the word 
“unity.” Particularly when dealing with a joint naval force (i.e., Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Coast Guard team), the need for a unified command structure and more flexible, 
streamlined sharing of resources is well illustrated in this case. In much the same manner 
as MEFEX-19, PB-19 also draws questions about the type and volume of data desired in 
EABO (e.g., real-time audio-visual data) and whether such expectations for data sharing 
are congruent with adherence to the principals of mission command doctrine (HQMC, 
2018; 9th Comm, 2019). 
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4. Case Study Final Conclusion and Recommendations 
a. Future Case Study Recommendation 
A common theme throughout the cases studied in this research is the desire for 
more detailed and comprehensive case material. In choosing the source documents of these 
case studies, the researchers were prohibitively limited in access, both to source 
documentations of a more substantial nature, and to the participating units for interview 
and clarification (attempts to reach and interview units in this study proved unsuccessful). 
As such, many of the observations and recommendations are made to the best of the 
researchers’ ability, but more liberally than they would have preferred. The researchers 
assert that the most valuable aspect of this study is the model by which aspects of C2 were 
analyzed: the insights into C2 itself are sufficient for a preliminary examination of the 
suitability of BSMN, but a much more thorough analysis of EABO exercises is necessary 
to confirm or deny the conclusions drawn in this study. Recommendations for future study 
are detailed following the conclusion of this research. 
b. Organizational Observations and Recommendations 
Figure 2 depicts the conceptual composition and arrangement of the EABO force 
at and below the MEF level. It includes recommendations for aspects of authority and task 




The U.S. Coast Guard element, increased Navy integration, and BSMN interoperability 
are outlined above in gray, and are recommended additions to the proposed task 
organization found in Appendix A of Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations (HQMC, 2021). Adapted from Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced 
Base Operations (HQMC, 2021). 
Figure 2. Notional EABO Task Organization with Recommendations 
(1) Additional U.S. Coast Guard Element, Navy Integration, and BSMN 
Interoperability 
One capability specifically addressed in the case studies is the law enforcement and 
sub-lethal operating capacity the Coast Guard could bring to EABO (1stMARDIV, 2019). 
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The same sentiment is echoed in the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations (HQMC, 2021), but is not specifically addressed in the tentative force structure 
model. The researchers recommend that a U.S. Coast Guard element with a habitual 
support relationship to the Marine Division or MLR (i.e., direct, or general, support) be an 
explicit element of the EABO task organization. 
In the same vein, tight integration of U.S. Navy forces is an explicit feature of 
EABO (CMC, 2019; HQMC, 2021). The exact nature of this integration is unclear to the 
researchers, though higher-level guidance about EABO and DMO generally suggests this 
integration would occur down to the EAB element level (CNO, 2018; CMC, 2019). Further 
research and/or clarification of the joint aspect of EABO would benefit C2 research. As it 
relates to the suitability of BSMN, the researchers assert that any technical solution for C2 
in EABO will have to be designed and implemented with joint interoperability in mind 
(i.e., the system will have to be made compatible with the systems of the naval force and 
other joint actors). 
(2) Decentralization of Authorities 
As illustrated in Exercise Norther Apache, EAB forces desire authorities for 
activities like fire support to increase their flexibility and negate the need for 
communication with distant, higher level commands (1/6, 2020). In respect to this, and 
after review and apparent concurrence of the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary 
Advanced Base Operations echelon tasking (HQMC, 2021, appx B), the researchers 
recommend that authorities for aviation and surface fires be vested at the LCT-level.  
(3) Two separate communication models in EABO  
Based on the stratification between tactical EABs and MEF-level units studied, the 
researchers recognize two distinct communications system environments in EABO, with 
the separation occurring at the digital divide (1stMARDIV, 2019). Below the digital divide, 
communication needs prioritize LPI/LPD, lower power requirements, longer transmission 
ranges, higher scalability (Wang et al., 2009, pp. 1–30), and more plentiful channels (1/6, 
2020). Above the digital divide, both studies of MEF-level exercises illustrate the 
continued desire for high capacity (i.e., throughput and bandwidth) communications 
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systems (MASS-6, 2019; 1stMARDIV, 2019). A more precise characterization of the 
separate needs for communication systems in EABO is provided below in the combined 
technical observations paragraph. 
c. Institutional observations and recommendations 
(1) Strategic Authorities for Tactical Level Commanders and Adherence to 
Mission Command 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–2, Campaigning (1997) defines the full 
spectrum of military actions in pursuit of national objectives in three stratifications: the 
strategic level of warfare is the broadest and encompasses the design and pursuit of national 
military objectives (HQMC, 1997, p. 9); the tactical level of warfare encompasses the 
actual conduct of battle, or engagement of the enemy (HQMC, 1997, p. 100); and the 
operational level of warfare concerns the art and science of accomplishing strategic 
military objectives through the planning and influence of tactical engagements (in a sense, 
the operational level of warfare is the figurative middle-ground between strategy and 
tactics) (HQMC, 1997, p. 100).  
With the levels of warfare thus defined, EABO’s principal function of placing 
dispersed tactical naval units with long-range fire support assets to deny freedom of 
maneuver to enemy strategic naval forces in designated littoral zones (HQMC, 2021) 
presents a unique stratification of the levels of warfare in this specific context, which is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The nature of strategic enemy targets and the extended range of 
tactical fire support assets means that tactical level units will interface with strategic 
objectives: this is a departure from previous engagements between opposing 
infantry/insurgent combatants, for example. Such engagements underscore the relatively 
higher importance of pronouncing clear guidance for tactical commanders, and particularly 
in cases where communications are limited. While technological solutions, like those 
sought in this study, could assist in overcoming environmental and enemy challenges to 
communication, the principles of Command Concepts (1999) still promote minimal 
communication as a sign of successful command and control. Mission command, expressed 
clearly, remains a critical requirement for the careful and effective application of tactical 
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force in potentially strategic outcomes (CNO, 2018). In doing so, authority for the use of 
fire support assets can be delegated to a level at or below the MLR, alleviating burdens for 
long-haul communication and allowing the tactical force to engage enemies in a timelier 
manner. This contrasts with more recent conflicts where authority to launch HIMARS 
resided at the division level, being that HIMARS served as a reinforcing or general support 
asset at the MEF or division level (in the researchers’ experience). 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Warfare 
Destratification in EABO 
Such decentralization of authority for the use of this tier of fire support assets means 
that these commanders must now be trained and empowered as such, with emphasis on the 
potentially strategic-level consequences of engaging an enemy naval ship.  Furthermore, 
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commanders at the EAB require the intelligence and communication apparatus necessary 
to positively identify their targets and prevent the negligent engagement of civilian vessels.  
(2) Renewed Focus on Mission Type Orders  
The long distance between dispersed EABs is both an intended feature of EABO 
and a burden for communications and logistics systems needed for operations. To act 
dynamically in EABO, subordinates at the tactical level must be empowered to act without 
having to wait for communications from higher command outside of the enemy weapon 
engagement zone (WEZ). In the case of EABO, this will not only be time and resource 
intensive, but may be challenged past the point of feasibility (CMC, 2019; HQMC, 2021).  
Therefore, the naval force must emphasize mission command in EABO, and 
empower tactical leaders to act within mission command. The empowerment includes: the 
timely and simple articulation of their respective commander’s intent; the provision of 
resources with which to act effectively (e.g., intelligence and fire support assets); and 
vestment with the authority required take tactical action that may have strategic impact. 
Any technical solution offered by BSMN for communications should be implemented in a 
way to increase the capacity for mission command, and not enable continuous and 
cumbersome detail command. MCDP-6: Command and Control [HQMC, 2018, p. 4] gives 
a fictional example of just such potential for advances in C2 technology inhibiting effective 
mission command). 
(3) The bursty rhythm of C2 
The researchers have thoroughly defined and stressed the importance of mission 
command up to this point in the study (HQMC, 2018). Without contradicting this notion, 
the researchers and this study’s advisor also recognize the logical correlation between the 
pace at which information is exchanged in a C2 system, and the tempo with which an 
organization is able to operate. This correlation, and particularly in the context of EABO, 
presents a notion which the advisor for this study, Alex Bordetsky, coined as the “bursty 
rhythm of C2” (email to authors, May 26–27, 2021). Thus far, the researchers have 
discussed bursty communications in a digital context, in which the timeframe for the 
transmission of information is in fractions of a second (Semtech, 2013). When considering 
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C2 in the EABO and in the mission command context, there is the potential for a similar 
phenomenon, but on a longer scale: EAB units could potentially operate within an enemy 
WEZ for an extended period of time (CMC, 2019; HQMC, 2021). When these units do 
eventually communicate with their higher headquarters, it logically follows that they would 
use the opportunity to transmit most of the necessary information, and particularly, the 
commander’s updated intent. Timeframes for these broader communication bursts could 
be on the order of hours, days, or even weeks.  
Thus, the researchers and Alex Bordetsky assert that the battle rhythm of EABO 
units would correlate to the bursty rhythm of C2 they are able to achieve (email to authors, 
26–27 May, 2021). A higher bursty rhythm of C2 (i.e., more frequent communications of 
essential information like the commander’s intent) are desirable to increase the tempo of 
operations. Again, the researchers would stress that the nature of information being passed 
in bursts should adhere to the nature of mission command, and because bursts are 
inherently intermittent, subordinates must be equipped to act in the absence of 
communication. 
(4) Increased Billets for Liaisons  
In the researchers’ experience, the emphasis placed on providing liaison to external 
units is not uniform, but rather depends on the unit and activity in question. While some 
organizations only put forth their best Marines for liaison billets, as that Marine will be a 
representative for the unit and warfighting community, others prefer to keep their most 
talented and proficient Marines employed within their unit. Given not only the wide variety 
of occupational specialties that are likely to interact within EABO units, but the 
intrinsically joint nature of EABO, researchers recommend more emphasis be placed on 
providing knowledgeable liaisons between units and echelons of an organization. Doing so 
will decrease requirements for communication between units (3dMARDIV, 2019).  
d. Combined Technical Observations 
Table 5 combines the technical observations made in all three cases studied and is 
generally divided between activities above and below the aforementioned digital divide. 
Due to the comparatively limited information related to the technical aspects of C2 in the 
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cases studied, the following observations should be verified through future analysis and 
technical study of C2 in EABO. 
Table 5. Combined Technical Study Observations 
 




(50-150km)  90mi (150km)  
Bandwidth, Data Rate 
Requirement/ Constraint 
BW: < 60MHz 
DR: < 9.6kbps 








Vehicle: < 32ft (10m) 
Man-pack: < 35ft (11m) 
113ft (34.7m)  
Number of Nodes/Users 
Served 
40 ≤ x ≤ 121 nodes > 1500 nodes 
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III. TECHNICAL TESTING 
A. TECHNICAL STUDY INTRODUCTION 
Having characterized the key conceptual and technical aspects of C2 in EABO, the 
researchers then sought to identify the technical aspects of BSMN through technical 
modeling to compare BSMN’s characteristics to the needs and limitations of C2 in EABO. 
While the researchers originally intended to analyze BSMN through its use with a 
miniaturized satellite (CubeSat) in low-earth orbit (LEO), complications with the payload 
hardware and delays in the launch of the transport rocket caused the researchers to opt, 
instead, to use conceptual modeling to analyze BSMN. This model is based on the 
operational communication requirements established in the Tentative Manual for 
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (HQMC, 2021), identified in Section II, 
Paragraph 5 of this study as transmission range, bandwidth, data rate capacity, power, 
antenna size, and number of nodes on a BSMN. A conceptual technical model is a 
theoretical composition of multiple concepts to represent the abstract relationship and 
interaction between technical theories to describe, explain, and illustrate a particular idea 
(Tatomir et al., 2018). 
1. Technical Study Purpose 
The purpose of the technical study is to observe and record the capabilities of 
BSMN relative to its use in a C2 system in a EABO environment. As discussed, the 
researchers seek to understand BSMN’s characteristic maximum transmission range, 
bandwidth and data rate capacity, power requirements, antenna dimension requirements, 
and node service capacity.  
2. Technical Study Method 
This study will provide quantitative data of potential signal modulation schemes 
for comparison with BSMN based on operational requirements. The technical capabilities 
and limitations of the potential signal modulation schemes will be evaluated in terms of 
conceptual experimentation using small satellite link budget calculations. The evaluation 
 
66 
criteria of potential modulation techniques will be established using a controls and 
variables method to determine relative correlation to performance. This experiment will 
help characterize elements critical to communication networks which can feasibly support 
EABO.  
3. Technical Study End-state 
The researchers sought to understand the technical characteristics of BSMN in 
order to compare these capabilities and requirements against the C2 capabilities and 
requirements of EABO, as derived from case studies. 
B. TECHNICAL STUDY DESIGN 
1. Overview 
The scope of this technical evaluation will cover the baseline characteristics, and 
fixed operational capacity of two separate signal modulation techniques: Chirp Spread 
Spectrum (CSS) and Long Range (LoRa). The baselines used for the evaluation will be 
based on the published performance parameters of CSS and LoRa signal modulation 
techniques. However, due to the limited resources allocated for this study, the specific 
variables evaluated will be limited to power, data capacity, and range. Both CSS and LoRa 
modulation techniques have published characteristics which include favorable LPI/LPD to 
EABO requirements. Additionally, to limit the number of variables, this study will use 
published antenna performance data as a control throughout the experiment. Lastly, this 
study will limit the experiment to point-to-point communication observations.  
2. Chirp Spread Spectrum Characteristics 
As previously discussed, CSS is a spread spectrum signal modulation technique 
that uses wideband linear frequency modulated chirp pulses to encode information (IEEE, 
2007). Employing CSS signal modulation techniques requires an assigned broad spectrum 
which is occupied for modulating information. Below, Ouyang and Zhao (2016) offer the 
mathematical representation of CSS modulation using Fresnel transform, phase, and chirp 
frequency as a function of time. It also depicts the bandwidth of the chirp signal and, 
inversely, the processing gain. 
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Most applications consider the frequency modulated (chirp) signal whose 
frequency evolves linearly or equivalently whose phase quadratically over 
time,  
 
where α is the chirp rate and φ0 is an initial phase. Its instantaneous 
frequency is, 
 
If the chirp signal is temporally limited within some period T, the bandwidth 
of the chirp signal B is determined by the chirp rate α and the period T, i.e., 
 
The time-bandwidth product α ∝ B × T indicates the processing gain of a 
chirp signal.  
Source: Ouyang, Zhao, (2016) 
These equations are critical in determining bandwidth, or spectral efficiency, which 
refers to the capacity or data rate which can be transmitted over a given bandwidth. “It is a 
measure of how efficiently a limited frequency spectrum is utilized by the physical layer 
protocol, and sometimes by the medium access control” (Miao et al., 2016, p. 124). A 
disadvantage of using CSS signal modulation is that it sacrifices spectral efficiency for 
higher processing gains. Regardless, a CSS modulated signal is appealing in cases where 
reliable, resilient communication is a priority, while capacity is not. 
3. LoRa Modulation Characteristics 
The intention of LoRa modulation is to establish a long-range network in which 
high data rate requirements are traded for range, signal integrity, and energy improvements. 
“The LoRa modulation is based on CSS scheme that uses wideband linear frequency-
modulated pulses whose frequency decreases or increases over a specific amount of time 
based on the encoded information” (Semtech, 2013, p. 67). LoRa modulation defines the 
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first layer in which established local area network (LAN) technologies, using mesh network 
architecture, increases the communication range and cell size of the network. In terms of 
Layer One, LoRa is a frequency (FM) modulation scheme in which end devices detect, 
transmit, receive, and identify manipulated radio waves with encoded information using a 
chirped, multi-symbol format (Ray, 2018). Additionally, the systems that support the 
modulation, including LoRa chips and gateways, help make up the physical layer.  
LoRa nodes are the sensors or application where sensing and control takes place. 
These nodes are often placed remotely (e.g., sensors, tracking devices, etc.) (3GLTEinfo, 
2016). These devices can be physically wired to a gateway host; however, they are 
generally designed to use radio communications to communicate with a gateway host for 
WAN communications.  
LoRa nodes/end-points are the sensors or application where sensing and control 
takes place. These nodes are often placed remotely (e.g., sensors, tracking devices, etc.) 
(LoRaWAN Tutorial, n.d.). These devices can be physically wired to a gateway host 
(critical to LoRaWAN), however, is generally designed to use radio communications to 
communicate with a gateway host for WAN communications. 
a. LoRa Data Rate 
“LoRa provides bidirectional communication which operates in the sub-GHz 
unlicensed frequency bands” (Liberg, 2018). “The channel bandwidth is mainly 125 kHz 
for European spectrum bands, and 125 or 500 kHz for U.S. spectrum bands” (Liberg, 
2018). Although LoRa sacrifices some data transfer capacity when compared to 
Frequency-shift Keying (FSK), it ultimately is more efficient in data transmission as it is 
less sensitive to noise interference during transmission and reception. LoRa uses three 
different bandwidth frequency bands: 125 kHz, 250 kHz, and 500 kHz (Liberg, 2018). 
LoRa symbols are modulated over an up-chirp frequency bandwidth and reciprocal down 
chirp. Additionally, it uses different orthogonal spreading factors (i.e., the rate at which the 
signal increases/decreases frequency) to differentiate between channels on a given 
bandwidth range.  
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As depicted in the Table 6, the data transfer rate is proportional to the spread factor 
(SF), which is directly corelated to the sensitivity to noise, distance a signal can be 
transmitted, and energy consumptions. The lower the spread factor, the higher the data 
transfer rates, the more sensitive it is to noise, and the more power required to complete 
the transmission.  





 Where: Rb = Bit Rate 
Source: Semtech (2013). 
SF = spreading factor (7..12) 
Source: Semtech (2013). 
 
BW = Bandwidth (Hz) 
Source: Semtech (2013). 
Table 6. LoRa Spreading Factors at 125 kHz . Source: Semtech (2013). 
 
 
b. LoRa Communication Channel and Signal Transmission 
LoRa nodes have established chirp rates and spread factors for their transmission 
which are published throughout the LoRa network infrastructure. The LoRa endpoints are 
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designed to detect specific chirp rates at specific SFs/slopes. These predetermined settings 
are what establishes the layer communication channel between the nodes/endpoints at the 
gateways. The nodes/endpoints transmit a preamble, “which can be set as a variable 
number of ‘symbols,’ which are just the number of chirps” (Ray, 2018). If there is a 
constant chirp at the right frequency and at the right chirp rate, a LoRa endpoint sends a 
reciprocal chirp, and will demodulate the signal with the encoded message. Figure 4 depicts 
the establishment of the LoRa layer one communication channel. 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of LoRa Layer One Communication Channel. 
Source: Ray (2018). 
Once the LAN is established, the LoRaWAN, defined as the system architecture 
and communication protocol, is responsible for implementation of functionality of 
remaining layers. 
4. Antenna Characteristics 
Antenna characteristics are critical to the functionality and performance of satellite 
communications. The two critical properties involved in this study are antenna gain and 
antenna efficiency. These two elements directly affect the link budget/link margin and are 
crucial in determining the S/N ratio of a communication link. 
Antenna gain, the measure of input power, is transferred and concentrated through 
the antenna, to propagate a signal in a predetermined direction (Wayana Software, 2015). 
Antenna gain is represented in the following equation where η is the antenna efficiency, D 
is the diameter of the antenna, and λ is the wavelength of the signal: 
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Gt = η(πD/λ)2  
Source: Wayana Software (2015). 
 
Antenna efficiency is the ratio of the amount power output from an antenna to the 
amount of power input to the antenna (Bevelacqua, 2016).  
η = antenna efficiency (unitless) = Poutput/Pinput 
Source: Bevelacqua (2016). 
 
“An ideal antenna has 100% antenna efficiency (i.e., it transmits all the power fed 
to it). But in the real world, a good antenna radiates only 50 to 60% of power supplied to 
it” (everythingRF, 2018). As such, this study incorporates a randomly generated antenna 
efficiency from 50 to 60% as represented in the graph below for a center frequency of 920 
MHz. Figure 5 depicts the relationship between antenna gain, efficiency, and the frequency 
of transmission. 
 
Figure 5. Antenna Efficiency, Gain, & Frequency Relationship. 
Source: Hong et al. (2014). 
5. Link Budget Evaluations 
To evaluate both CSS and LoRa signal modulations as viable techniques to support 
BSMNs, we must establish common controls, and dependent and independent variables. 
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Since LoRa is a derivative of CSS, the researchers evaluated both modulation schemes 
under the same circumstances to determine effectiveness and applicability of supporting 
point-to-point communications. In this scenario, a ground-to-ground terminal, or a ground-
to-airborne terminal (high altitude), are synonymous with point-to-point communications. 
Additionally, both terminals are considered stationary and are the only two nodes of 
communication on the established link. Lastly, the following variables were held in 
constant throughout the evaluations: 
• Transmitter Power: 0.5 W for CSS and 0.158 Watts (Maximum Power 
output for LoRa devices) for LoRa 
• Bandwidth: 125 kHz. Minimum bandwidth design for LoRa devices 
• Center Frequency: 920 MHz 
• Antenna Efficiency: 0.5-0.6  
• Antenna Size: 2 meters 
• Receiver Sensitivity: -137 dB 
• Noise Floor: 6 dB 
Holding these elements in constant allowed the researchers to determine how range 
(independent variable) effects the feasibility of establishing a viable communication link 
in terms of link budget/link margin, and S/N ratio (dependent variables).  
• Range (Independent Variable) 
• Link Budget/Link Margin (Dependent Variable) 
• Signal to Noise (S/N) Ratio (Dependent Variable) 
• Data Capacity (Dependent Variable) 
To complete the evaluation, the researchers established six benchmarks for the 
independent variable at 1, 25, 50, 100, 400, and 500 kilometers to determine the impacts 
on Link Budget/Link Margin, S/N ratio, and data capacity. The first benchmark (1 km) is 
used to demonstrate the functionality of the communication link at near ideal conditions. 
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The next three benchmarks (25, 50, and 150 km) were established in Table 4, Combined 
technical study observations, as maximum transmission ranges of current forces, using 
traditional communication network topologies and equipment, while operating below the 
digital divide. The last two benchmarks (400–500 km) were established as required 
operating ranges above the digital divide, as well as being the altitude above the earth’s 
surface at which LEO satellites operate in orbit. As the range between communication 
nodes increases, communication links start to succumb to external factors, like 
atmospheric attenuation, physical obstacles, free space loss, noise and other signal 
interference, which degrade signal propagation. These degradations become more 
significant at greater ranges and create significant challenges for the propagated signal to 
overcome and have been built into the testing models for both CSS and LoRa signal 
modulation schemes. 
The following equations have been established to determine the S/N involved 
with propagating a CSS modulated signal. First, the researchers determined the antenna 
gains for both the transmitter and receiver. For initial testing, researchers recommended 
using the same antenna settings to ensure consistent performance and maintain 
experiment controls. As previously discussed, the equation for antenna gain is:  
Gt = η(4πA/λ2) = η(πD/λ)2 
η = antenna efficiency (unitless) → 0.5 -0.9 typical 
A = area of antenna (meters2) 
D = diameter of antenna (meters) → circular areas only 
λ = wavelength of signal (meters)  
Also, the researchers needed to determine the wavelength of the propagated signal. 
Since they have established a center frequency of 920 MHz, the researchers used the 
following equation to determine wavelength: 
f = c/λ 
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c = speed of light = 2.98 x 108 m/s 
λ = c/f 
λ = (2.98 x 108 m/s)/920MHz 
λ = 0.324 m 
Next the researchers accounted for free space loss, which is the diminishing signal 
strength as it travels between two antennas (Bevelacqua, 2016). Free space loss is 
determined by the distance between two antennas, which the researchers varied among the 
six established benchmarks to determine the effect range has on signal propagation. The 
researchers used the following equations for free space loss: 
Lfs = (λ/4πR)2 
R = distance between antennas 
Lastly, the researchers used the following equation to determine the strength of the 
propagated signal: 
 
Signal (in dB) = Pt + Gt + Line Losst + Gr + Line Lossr + Lfs + 
Attenuation 
Pt = Power at the transmitter 
Gt = Antenna gain at the transmitter 
Line Losst = Line loss at the transmitter 
Gr = Antenna gain at the receiver 
Line Lossr = Line loss at the receiver 




Applying the established controls (a consistent power of 0.5 W, antenna diameter 
of 0.5 meters, transmitter/receiver line loss of 0.9 dB each, and attenuation of -0.1 dB), the 
researchers were able to determine a CSS propagated signal strength.  
The last step is determining the S/N ratio, which required the researchers to 
determine the noise for each scenario of the experiments. Once determined, the researchers 
maintained a constant noise level throughout the experiment. The following equation was 
used to determine noise: 
N in dB = 10 x log10 (kTB) 
k = Boltzmann’s constant= 1.38 x 10–23 Joules/K 
T = temperature in Kelvin 
B = bandwidth of receiver in Hz 
N= 10 x log10 (1.38 x 10–23 Joules/K) x ( 305.37 K) x (125,000,000 Hz) 
N = -122.78 dB 
 
For the temperature in Kelvin, the researchers used a constant 305.37 degrees K as 
it converts to 90 degrees Fahrenheit, which is similar to conditions in the INDOPACOM 
AOR. Additionally, the constant bandwidth of 125 MHz was applied. As a result, the 
consistent noise level for this experiment was -122.78 dB. 
To complete the S/N ratio assessment, the researchers then subtracted the calculated 
noise from the calculated propagated signal to determine the S/N ratio per range, given a 
randomized antenna efficiency between 0.5 and 0.6. 
To determine a S/N ratio for LoRa modulation, the researchers conducted the same 
process as CSS, however, included a change in power output, reducing it from 0.5W for 
 
76 
CSS to 0.158W for LoRa as it is the published maximum power output for LoRa 
nodes/devices.  
C. TECHNICAL STUDY OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS 
The researchers model included a total of 500 observations per established range 
benchmark, given a randomized antenna efficiency to determine an average S/N ratio. 
These observations were conducted for both CSS modulation with 0.5W and LoRa 
modulation with 0.158W of power output, respectively. Figure 6 is an excerpt from the 
model tables demonstrating variation and averages of antenna efficiency and S/N ratio for 
CSS at 0.5 W of output power, while Figure 7 depicts a LoRa power output of 0.158 W. 
 
 
Figure 6. CSS Modulation with a 0.5-Watt Power Output  
 




As depicted, for both CSS and LoRa modulations, there is an inverse relationship 
between transmission range and S/N ratio: as the range of transmission increases, the S/N 
ratio decreases. There are multiple factors which can be attributed to this relationship, 
however, for this study the researchers focused on power output. Also, depicted in Figure 
8, at each respective range the S/N ratio of the CSS modulation technique is slighter higher 
than the LoRa modulation.  
 
Figure 8. Average S/N Ratio for CSS and LoRa Modulations by 
Transmission Range 
For this experiment, the researchers have attributed this effect to the higher power 
output of CSS versus LoRa. However, these results do not infer that CSS is more effective 
or appropriate. Since LoRa is a derivative of CSS, the researchers deduct that both CSS 
and LoRa have similar characteristics, and that given the same power output, theoretically, 
should produce similar S/N ratio. 
Using the established noise floor constant of 6 dB, being the level at which the 
propagated signal can no longer be detected, received, demodulated, and decoded 
appropriately due to noise interference, this evaluation demonstrates that the theoretical 
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effectiveness of CSS modulation technique can support signal propagation up to 
approximately 150 km. LoRa modulation, however, can support approximately 125 km. 
Regardless, both modulation techniques can only support signal propagation below the 
established digital divide. However, as the transmission range extends over 100 km and 
approaches the noise floor, it is a reasonable assumption that loss of transmission signal 
due to movement of antennas, atmospheric attenuation, change in atmospheric 
temperature, interference, absorption, terrain, signal diffraction, etc., is likely, and the 
successful transmission and receipt of the propagated signal is diminished. These are all 
areas in which further research and field testing is required to determine the practicality of 
each propagation technique to support the employment of BSMNs in EABO. 
D. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS OF BSMN FOR C2 IN EABO 
The purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of employing a low 
power, LPI/LPD BSMN to support C2 of EABO in the INDOPACOM AOR. Using the 
guidance established in this study, DOD forces are mandated to diligently manage their 
EM signature in support of force protection and survivability. As demonstrated, CSS and 
LoRa modulation techniques provide potential solutions to difficult C2 and communication 
topology challenges presented by EABO.  
Using this model and the demonstrated positive effects that power output has on 
S/N ratio, the researchers believe that CSS and LoRa modulation techniques employed in 
a BSMN are potential solutions to support C2 and communication topologies while 
conducting DMO and EABO. Although this study demonstrated that CSS and LoRa 
modulation techniques were effective below the digital divide (150 km), it may be possible 
to support communications above the digital divide by simply increasing power output. 
The researchers recommend caution in interpreting this as a viable solution to support 
communication above the digital divide as it contests operational guidance from the DOD. 
By increasing power output by as little as 5 Watts, the S/N would meet the requirement to 
support communications up to 500 km. However, at 5 Watts, transmitters also become 
more susceptible to signal and physical detection by adversarial forces through use of EM 
signature detection capabilities and direction finding. Once located, adversarial forces can 
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target friendly forces to disrupt operations. This is concerning as it directly impacts force 
protection efforts and increases risk to force and risk to mission while conducting EABO.  
Additionally, DMO and EABO require efficient use of limited resources, one of 
which is power and power generation. By increasing power output, forces would decrease 
their power resources, and require additional logistical support and additional resupply 
efforts. This too increases risk to force and risk to mission as more movements create 
greater opportunity for adversaries to track, locate, and target DOD forces.  
This study has identified specific performance characteristics of CSS and LoRa 
signal modulation techniques which are effective below the digital divide (<150 km), 
however, both CSS and LoRa modulation techniques require further modification, 
amplification, and testing to determine their suitability above the digital divide (> 150 km). 
This study is the first iteration of a larger research effort to research and develop suitable 
signal modulation techniques to create an effective BSMN using land-based, mobile, and 
space-based terminal. This study has demonstrated the theoretical point-to-point 
communication link (land-based and mobile terminals); however, follow-on study will  
be required to research the viability of including spaced-based terminal in the current 
BSMN topology.  
 
80 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
81 
IV. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
A. FINANCIAL STUDY INTRODUCTION 
1. Financial Study Purpose 
The purpose of the financial study is to determine the financial viability of BSMN 
technology for use as a broader C2 system. In particular, the researchers seek to determine 
the financial requirements and feasibility of acquiring, developing, deploying, and 
maintaining the software and hardware required to establish a space-based terminal to 
include in a BSMN topology.  
2. Financial Study Method 
This study will use open-source cost structures of three commercial space 
development and launch companies to provide quantitative data for cost comparison and 
estimation. The researchers will use these results will help create a model to estimate a 
CubeSat program life cycle cost structure. The projected program cost estimates will be 
compared to current space-based programs to determine relative cost in reference to 
established satellite program budgets.  
3. Financial Study End-state 
The researchers seek to understand the total costs and budget requirements of 
acquiring, developing, deploying, and maintaining the software and hardware required to 
include space-based terminals to support a BSMN topology. 
4. Financial Study Design 
The previous chapters presented a possible low power, efficient modulation scheme 
as foundation to the employment of a BSMN in support of EABO. Ultimately, this research 
is to evaluate the feasibility of a BSMN through the employment of a CubeSat 
constellation, whose infrastructure id low-cost, low maintenance, while maintaining its 
global effectiveness. This chapter will analyze the cost for acquiring, developing, 
deploying, and maintaining the software and hardware required to establish a space based 
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BSMN terminals. Cost estimates and budgets will be based on commercial satellite 
industry standards from spaceflight development companies’ published pricing schedules. 
An average of those pricing schedules will be used to create an acquisition model and 
propose a program life cycle for space-based terminals to support BSMNs. 
Size of Bursty-Signal Mesh Network. This study will include projected costs of a 
100-satellite constellation to support large scale coverage to multiple AORs across the 
globe. Since the projected CubeSat constellation will be deployed in a LEO orbit (approx. 
altitude 400–500 km), the orbital period of a satellite, which is the time it takes make one 
revolution around the earth, will be between 92–94 minutes and will be traveling at 
approximately 7.7 km/s.  
These characteristics effect the maximum communication interval, which is the 
time a ground terminal can communicate with the satellite while it passes overhead. 
Generally, a satellite at LEO must be a minimum of 15 degrees above the horizon, 
horizontal plane, from the ground station in order to establish a LOS communication link 
(Cakaj et al., 2014). However, due to high rate of travel of a LEO satellite, the 
communication interval is very minimal (e.g., 3–5 minutes on average for altitudes of  
400–500 km) per orbital period (Dredge & Timmins, 2017). 
To mitigate the gap between satellite communication intervals, organizations must 
deploy a multi-satellite constellation to maintain a continuous communication link. The 
required number of satellites to support continuous coverage depends on the orbital 
characteristics of the constellation, however, commercial industry has provided a 
benchmark in which the researchers determined a projected number of satellites to support 
the constellation by average current commercial LEO constellations.  
This study referenced four commercial spaceflight and satellite companies which 
operate multi-satellite LEO constellation with global coverage. Although, there are many 
of companies which are currently operating, or intend to operate mega constellations with 
hundreds and thousands of CubeSats at LEO, this study focused on balancing costs and 
functionality of a space-based terminals to support a BSMN. As a result, the researchers 
focused on minimum number of satellites required to support such priorities. Represented 
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in Figure 9, the average number of satellites required for global coverage is 81.25. 
Accounting for maintenance issues, loss of functionality, and required redundancy, the 
researchers used determined that developing 100 CubeSats was a realistic requirement for 
this study. This number will be used to support the cost estimation of the payload and 
launch requirements of the CubeSat constellation. 
 
Adapted from Marco Polo (2020), Iridium Satellite Communications 
(2021), ORBCOMM (2021), and LeoSat (2021). 
Figure 9. Average Number of Satellites in LEO Constellations 
B. COST COMPONENTS AND ESTIMATION 
Cost components for a space-based satellite program are generally made up of four 
sections of development: 1) payload, 2) ground stations, 3) personnel, operations, and 
maintenance, and 4) launch. The sum of the costs of each section makes up the total cost 
of a space-based satellite program. As such the following equation can be used to 
demonstrate total costs of the program (Heyman, 2009): 
CostTotal = CostPayload + CostGroundStation + CostPO&M + CostLaunch 
Using this cost equation, the researchers can develop projected estimations for each 
of the four sections. Each section contains several components which will be identified, 
and cost averaged per industry standards. Figure 10 depicts the average of three 
commercial spaceflight companies and their published pricing schedules. Using these 
pricing schedules, the researchers can develop a model to depict the total cost of a CubeSat 
constellation to support a BSMN.  
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1. Cost of Payload Development 
Cost of payload development is the first element is the cost structure equation. The 
researchers evaluated and averaged the costs of critical components of three commercial 
satellite development companies. Figure 10 demonstrates the required components and 
average associated costs with regard to development and construction of a one 3U CubeSat. 
“U” stands for unit, which is a common unit of measure describing size of a CubeSat. The 
dimensions of one “U” are equal to 10cm x 10cm x 10cm cube (NASA, 2017). Thus, the 
3U satellite used for this study is equivalent to 10cm x 10cm x 30cm structure. A 3U is 
required to maintain all the physical components of a designed CubeSat listed in Figure 10. 
Since the projected constellation consists of 100 CubeSats, the researchers multiply the 
average cost by 100.  
 
Adapted from Marco Polo (2020), Pumpkin Space Systems (2021), and EnduroSat (2021). 
Figure 10. Average Payload Development Costs 
2. Cost of Ground Station Development 
The second cost component is the ground station development. The ground station 
is required to communicate with and control the operational functions of the CubeSat 
constellation. A constellation requires multiple ground stations, while each ground station 
requires a minimum of four antennas to handle to communication load of the constellation 
(Marco Polo, 2020). Figure 11 depicts the cost components of developing and maintain a 
ground station for a period of ten years. Since two ground stations are required, the total 




Figure 11. Ground Station Development and 10-Year Service Cost. 
Source: Marco Polo (2020). 
3. Cost of Personnel, Operations, and Maintenance 
The personnel and labor associated with the development, operations, and 
maintenance of the CubeSat constellations are the costliest component of the project. 
Personnel are responsible for the design, manufacturing, assembly, launch support, 
monitoring, operation, and maintenance of every CubeSat launched into orbit. As depicted 
on Figure 12, the costs associated with personnel are generally salary over a ten-year 
service contract, which accounts for a 2% percent performance raise each year. 
Additionally, the costs associated with the hardware/software upgrades throughout the life 
of the program are listed.  
 
Figure 12. Personnel, Operations, and Maintenance Cost. 
Source: Marco Polo (2020). 
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4. Costs of Constellation Launch 
The fourth and final component is the costs associated with launching the payload 
into orbit. This is contracted through commercial spaceflight companies which have 
developed ride share programs which serve multiple customers and multiple payloads who 
share the same launch timeline and orbit altitude. The rideshare programs have 
significantly decreased the cost of launching payloads into space as the total launch costs 
are spread throughout all customers and is relative to payload size. For this study, the 
researchers referenced the price schedules of three commercial companies for a single 
orbital plane, LEO launch. To service the largest area possible with a BSMN, the 
constellation will operate on multiple orbital planes. As such, each orbital plane requires a 
separate launch vehicle as each vehicle is schedule to achieve a predetermined altitude to 
deploy its payload. This designated altitude cannot be altered or deviated from post-launch. 
Thus, for this study, the researchers have separated the constellation into four separate 
orbital planes, which will require four separate launches containing 25 CubeSats scheduled 
for each launch. As depicted in Figure 13., this study has calculated an average total cost 
of a four-launch schedule.  
 
Adapted from Marco Polo (2020), Space X (2021), and Spaceflight (2021). 
Figure 13. Average Launch Cost 
C. TOTAL COMPONENT COSTS 
Using the equation presented in Section B.2 in this chapter (Heyman, 2009), 
CostTotal = CostPayload + CostGroundStation + CostPO&M + CostLaunch 
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we can present estimated total cost of acquiring, developing, deploying, and maintaining 
the software and hardware required for space-based terminals. The estimated total cost of 
the 100 CubeSat constellation is: $36,011,966.33. However, this is a very small data 
sample does not provide much confidence in the financial data presented as it does not 
account for many variances of potential pricing changes. As a result, the researchers 
developed a cost forecasting model to add confidence to the dataset and into the financial 
analysis.  
Cost Forecasting Model. Since there is limited data regarding industry pricing 
schedule surrounding each of the four cost components for CostTotal,  this study presents a 
forecasting model to help build confidence and identify variance within industry pricing to 
support this research. To establish the model, the researchers started by building a robust 
the data set. The researchers created a formula to simulate the average cost of production 
of each component and subcomponent of the CostTotal formula. This calculation required 
the average costs of each subcomponent, highlighted in the red box depicted in Figure 14, 
to incur a randomized 1–15 percent increase in production costs. These average costs were 
used for each of the four cost components.  
 
Adapted from Marco Polo (2020), Iridium Satellite Communications (2021), ORBCOMM (2021), and 
LeoSat (2021). 
Figure 14. Average Payload Development Costs 
The following equation was used to simulate average cost of production: 
Total Average Costsubcomponent =  
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(Average Costsubcomponent x Rand(1-15%) + Average Costsubcomponent) 
Example:   
• Average Costsubcomponent: $8,758.67 
• Randomized function produces: 7%  
• Total Average Costsubcomponent =  
o ($8,758.67 x 0.07) +$8,758.67 = $9,371.78 
This study conducted 1000 iterations of this equation for each cost subcomponent 
to simulate cost variances. Then the researchers used the produced data set to calculate 
average cost over the 1000 interactions. The average cost of each subcomponent was then 
added together to produce an average total cost for each cost component (i.e., CostPayload; 
CostGroundStation ; CostPO&M ; CostLaunch). Figure 15 depicts portion of the data set produced 
for the CostPayload subcomponents. Finally, the average total of the CostPayload was used to 
build the forecasting model. 
 
Figure 15. Portion of the CostPayload Simulated Data Set 
Once all the data was compiled for the forecasting model, which used the 1000 
iterations of simulated historical data to produce data for the forecasting model. The 
researchers used the forecasting function within Microsoft Excel which uses the produced 
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historical data and AAA version of the Exponential Smoothing (ETS) algorithm to predict 
future values. The forecasting model was used with the following parameters: 
• Confidence Interval: 95% 
• Seasonality: None 
• Predicted Value Range: 250 predicted values 
Once compiled, the researchers then calculated the average total forecasted 
CostPayload from the 250 forecasted. Each of the forecasted CostPayload total was then 
compared to the initial Average CostPayload from Figure 16 and determined the difference. 
The researchers then determined the mean and standard deviation of the of the difference 
of the forecasted totals and the original average total.  
Example: 
• Original Average CostPayload : $102,716.33 
• Forecasted CostPayload 1: $108,728.52 
• Difference: $6,012.19 
The calculated data for CostPayload is depicted below: 
• Original Cost Average:102,716.33 
• Mean of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: $5,789.10 
• Standard Deviation of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: 
$1,011.27 
This same procedure was also conducted for the remaining three cost components: 
(CostGroundStation ; CostPO&M ; CostLaunch). Below are the forecasted data: 
• CostGroundStation : 
o Original Cost Average: $826,000 
o Mean of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: $56,362.91 
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o Standard Deviation of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: 
$570.67 
• CostPO&M : 
o Original Cost Average: $10,895,000.00 
o Mean of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: $640,755.19 
o Standard Deviation of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: 
$100,450.77 
• CostLaunch : 
o Original Cost Average: $13,933,333.33 
o Mean of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: $621,401.30 
o Standard Deviation of the Difference of Forecasted Total CostPayload: 
$108,474.16 
This data can now be used to estimate the mean CostTotal by combining the 
original Cost Average with the calculated mean difference of forecasted components 
plus or minus the standard deviation of the difference of the forecasted component cost. 
As a result, this study has produced the following three equations: 
CostTotalMean = CostPayloadMean + CostGroundStationMean + CostPO&M Mean+ 
CostLaunchMean 
CostTotalMean-StdDev = CostPayload Mean-StdDev + CostGroundStation Mean-StdDev + 
CostPO&M Mean-StdDev + CostLaunch Mean-StdDev 
CostTotal Mean+StdDev = CostPayload Mean+StdDev + CostGroundStation Mean+StdDev + 
CostPO&M Mean+StdDev + CostLaunch Mean+StdDev 
Using these equations, the CostTotalMean, CostTotal-StdDev, and CostTotal+StdDev can be 
computed. These values are listed in Figure 16 which depicts that the low-end project 
estimation is $38,181,683.13, while the high-end estimation is $38,802,928.33, and the 
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mean estimation is $38, 492,73. Figure 17 further lists a portion of the forecasted CostPayload 
data set, with the same data set graphed in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 16. CostTotal with Standard Deviation Included 
 




Figure 18. Graph of Forecasted CostPayload Data Set 
D. FINANCIAL STUDY OBSERVATIONS, FINDINGS AND VIABILITY OF 
BSMN FOR C2 IN EABO 
When comparing the estimations demonstrated in the previous section with funding 
for current DOD satellite programs we can determine the viability of acquiring, developing, 
deploying, and maintaining the software and hardware required to establish a space-based 
terminals to include in a BSMN topology.  
Listed below is the FY2019 Selected Acquisition Report covering the Wideband 
Global SATCOM (WGS) System. Figure 19 depicts the Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB) which started in 2010 and is current today. This APB depicts the estimated total 





Figure 19. Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 2010. Source: GBS (2018). 
Additionally, Figure 20 depicts the Annual Space procurement funding for the Air 
Force which FY 2016, 2017, and 2018 were each attributed at least $48 million for the 
WGS program.  
 
Figure 20. Annual Funding, Air Force WGS Program. Source: GBS (2018). 
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Both figures demonstrate the large amounts of money allocated yearly, and 
throughout the life cycle of a space-based satellite program. When comparing to estimated 
total cost of the BSNM constellation of approximately $39 million dollars, the researchers 
deduct that it is very feasible, from a financial perspective, to acquire, develop, deploy, and 
maintain the software and hardware required to establish a space-based terminals to include 
in a BSMN topology. This estimated cost is less than 1% of the total APB of the WGS 
program. With the potential benefits produced by BSMNs, it is reasonable to argue that the 
financial commitment would benefit the DOD. 
E. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Through gathering of open-source information from commercial satellite and 
spaceflight companies, the researchers were able to develop a financial forecasting model 
which referenced average components costs related to the development, manufacturing, 
operation, and maintenance of a LEO constellation. These are based on current industry 
standards regarding pricing for each cost component (payload, ground station, personnel, 
operations and maintenance, and launch) and then were simulated over 1000 interactions 
to build simulated historical information. Using the simulated historical information, the 
researchers built a forecasting model which provided the mean, and higher and lower levels 
of total cost of all components regarding the development, manufacturing, operation, and 
maintenance of a LEO constellation to support BSMNs.  
Upon processing the information and making a comparative analysis of the current 
WGS program, the researchers deduct that since the total component costs are less than 
one percent of the WGS APB, it is reasonable and financially viable to acquire, develop, 
deploy, and maintain the software and hardware required to establish a LEO satellite 











A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Hypothesis Test 
The researchers hypothesized that BSMN is a suitable technological solution to 
provide both the resilience and stealth for C2 required by the EABO construct, and that 
BSMN is a financially viable technology to develop and acquire for use in EABO C2. 
Creating a BSMN, based on CSS and LoRa modulation techniques, as a technical 
solution for C2 in EABO demonstrated significant potential to support communications 
below the digital divide (<150 km).  
Regarding the viability of developing and acquiring BSMN for C2 in EABO, the 
researchers that it is reasonable and very viable to provide the financial support to acquire, 
develop, deploy, and maintain the software and hardware required to establish a space-
based terminal to include in a BSMN topology. 
2. Answers to Research Questions 
All answers to research questions below were offered with a repetition of the 
researchers’ previously expressed caveats: more research, using more robust case study 
source and models/simulations, are necessary to answer these questions in a more reliable 
and rigorous manner. Having said this, the researchers answered the following questions 
as accurately and thoroughly as possible with the resources and methods available.  
• What are the intended/optimal characteristics of the C2 structure for EABO, and 
how is this structure distinct from that of conventional operations?  
o EABO commanders should place increased emphasis on: building and 
maintaining a clear pre-conceived vision of the environment, the enemy, 
and actions to address the situation; monitoring the realization of their 
vision in execution, and if their vision is incongruent with reality, find and 
correct the faults in their vision; and constrain their C2 apparatus to 
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exclusively transmit information that is relevant to build, convey, or alter 
their vision (Builder et al., 1999). 
o Conceptually, an optimal C2 system makes known the commander’s intent 
well before the engagement in question and is characterized by minimal 
communication during execution (Builder et al., 1999).  
o The researchers assert that C2 systems for use below the digital divide, 
(e.g., MLRs and EABO TEs), prioritize stealth (i.e., LPI/LPD), lower 
power consumption, smaller size, and lower weight, longer range, and 
greater flexibility/scalability. 
o The researchers assert that C2 systems above the digital divide prioritize 
throughput and bandwidth necessary to support data rich communications. 
• How does the EABO environment, as it relates to C2, create risks to force and 
mission?  
o Logistical limitations: austere AOs to support EABs lack infrastructure 
and require naval forces to operate in a self-contained and self-sustained 
manner: due to the nature and locations of prospective EABs, logistical 
resources are a limiting constraint to which C2 systems are viable and the 
manner in which C2 systems can operate (HQMC, 2021).  
o Contested electromagnetic communication: the ability of enemy forces to 
detect, intercept, and/or target the sources of electromagnetic radiation 
(i.e., our communication systems) for kinetic and non-kinetic attack places 
EABO forces and mission at risk (Office of the Secretary of Defense 
[SecDef], 2017; HQMC, 2021). 
o Long transmission range: the essential nature of EABO puts certain forces 
within an enemy WEZ, while other forces operate from outside the WEZ 
(HQMC, 2021). This creates the potential requirement for long-range 
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communication (the researchers estimate upwards of 150 km), which if 
not supported, presents a risk to mission. 
o Operational scalability: EABO employs widely dispersed and 
expeditionary forces to counter enemy A2AD threats. Many EABO forces 
are mobile, and EABs are established and disestablished rapidly to prevent 
targeting by the enemy (HQMC, 2021). This implies that a C2 system that 
is unable to rapidly scale itself to support communications from more or 
fewer nodes is insufficient to enable C2, and potentially endangers the 
mission. 
• What potential technical capabilities are provided by BSMN to support C2 
infrastructures in EABO environments? Can these capabilities be feasibly applied 
to support EABO command, control, and communications’ frameworks?  
o This study established a total of six range (1 km, 25 km, 50 km, 150 km, 
400 km, 500 km) benchmarks in which the researchers evaluated the 
effectiveness of establishing a communication link using CSS and LoRa 
modulation techniques. Through multiple model iterations, CSS and LoRa 
modulation techniques proved to be theoretically effective in establishing 
a communication link below the digital divide (<150 km), while 
generating an unfavorable S/N ratio above the digital dive (>150 km). As 
such, the researchers argue that CSS and LoRa modulation techniques are 
potential capabilities which would support the establishment of BSMNs to 
support C2 infrastructure in EABO environments. 
• What potential operational capabilities are provided by employing bursty-signal 
mesh network to support C2 infrastructures in EABO environments? How does 
BSMN support or increase the bursty rhythm of C2 in EABO? 
o This study identified how power output at the transmitter can effectively 
increase the link margin and create a favorable S/N ration. By increasing 
the power output to 5 Watts, the researchers determined that both CSS and 
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LoRa modulation were able to create a successful communication link 
above the digital divide (>150 km); specifically at ranges of 400 and 500 
km, respectively. As such, this study had demonstrated the theoretical 
viability of a BSMN to support low-power, limited data rate UHF 
SATCOM communication links. This capability can supplement and 
augment current UHF SATCOM resources which are deficient with 
respect to the demand for UHF SATCOM capabilities. BSMN support or 
increase the bursty rhythm of C2 in EABO? 
• What fiscal requirements and financial characteristics are associated with 
development, procurement, implementation, and maintenance of a bursty-signal 
mesh network to support C2 infrastructures in EABO environments?  
o This study identified the financial and budget requirement involved with 
included space-based terminals in a BSMN. The researchers determined 
that in order to be operationally and cost effective, a multi-year CubeSat 
program would have to be established to ensure the proper acquisition 
development, deployment, and maintenance of the software and hardware 
required for a space based BSMN terminals. This program of record 
would have strategic level impacts regarding budgetary discourse and 
would require significant attention and support from the DOD to be 
successful.  
o Overall, the program cost of a LEO BSMN constellation would be 
approximately $38,802,928.33 over ten years. This amount of funding is 
not too significant that it makes this program unfeasible, however, it is 
large enough that funding would have to increase significantly to support a 
space-based satellite program for BSMN. 
• What is the cost-benefit analysis of employing a bursty-signal mesh network to 
support C2 infrastructures in EABO environments over current structures?  
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o The estimated cost of the program would be $38,802,928.33, which is a 
significant portion of the DOD’s UHF LOS satellite communication 
budget. Unless strategic leaders decide to create additional funding for the 
new program of record, the DOD would have to reallocate limited 
resources to fund this project. If this is the case, the DOD is essentially 
transitioning critical strategic level resources to tactical level units to 
support operations. However, as previously discussed, the current DOD 
SATCOM resources are already over-tasked and underfunded as it is, thus 
creating further operating deficiencies across the department. Instead, the 
DOD should look to expanding funding for this program as it would not 
only increase capabilities across tactical and operational levels of war, but 
it will also relieve some of the strain and tasking of current DOD 
SATCOM capabilities.  
B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
iv. The researchers originally sought to conduct the case studies for this research 
using more detailed and comprehensive documents that could potentially reveal 
more about the characteristics of C2, i.e., complete OPORDs with annexes and 
appendices. These documents, as well as requests for interviews with Marines 
familiar with the exercises for amplifying information, were ultimately 
unavailable for this research. The researchers recommend that future studies 
seeking information similar to this study (i.e., research involving the 
characterization of C2 in particular operating models) would benefit from 
access to these comprehensive documents.  
v. Much of the research conducted in this study was built on the principle 
understanding that a C2 system can suffer from too much information: 
specifically, there are volumes and types of information that do not 
meaningfully enhance a commander’s ability to understand the critical aspects 
of the enemy and environment, and that do not meaningfully inform a 
commander of a need to alter their vision of action in pursuit of a shared goal. 
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In the PB-19 case study, the question of whether audio-visual information from 
COMMSTAT (previously known as Combat Camera) was needed in real-time 
from EABs (3dMARDIV, 2019). A more precise study that seeks to answer 
how much and what type of audio-visual information is truly beneficial to the 
formation of the commander’s vision would be worthwhile to inform studies 
like this one.  
vi. Exercise PB-19 brought into question the integration and line of authority of 
aviation units and capabilities in EABO (1stMARDIV, 2019). Upon review of 
the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (HQMC, 
2021), the researchers assumed that many of the issues faced in PB-19 were due 
to artificial limitations of the exercise, and specifically, the absence of an LLB 
that would have made those relationships and authorities clearer. However, the 
researchers recommend further analysis of the dynamic of aviation units and 
capabilities in the MLR, specifically, as they relate the EAB mission sets of the 
LCT that relate to aviation operations (e.g., establishing FARPs). 
vii. The technical research identified many areas which fell outside the scope of this 
study. Although the researchers identified and employed controls in term 
theoretical antenna characteristics, the following antenna design characteristics 
should be evaluated for applicability and appropriateness: confirm, modify, 
deny antenna efficiency, size, shape, and type established in this study through 
field testing. Additionally, further research should explore other antenna 
parameters outside those established in this study. 
viii. Researchers recommend evaluating the effects of antenna height during point-
to-point communication and it affects the communication link. Additionally, 
the researchers recommend further investigation regarding the how antenna 
height will affect signal propagation, as well as, how height impacts 
atmospheric attenuation, change in atmospheric temperature, interference, 
absorption, terrain, signal diffraction during transmission.  
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ix. This study established and constant of 0.158 and 0.5 Watts of power 
consumption at the transmitters. The researchers recommend further 
investigation regarding the impacts on signal propagation of CSS and LoRa 
modulation techniques with varying power settings. Additionally, any 
investigation of power consumption should include the logistical support 
requirements for established power setting and correlate the impact of power 
generation resources. 
x. This study evaluated point-to-point communication links involving two nodes. 
The researchers recommend further research to include more than two nodes 
and evaluate to feasibility of a multi-node BSMN and the impacts on 
transmission range, performance, capacity, and efficiency. 
xi. One element of the point-to-point communication link established in this study 
was the stationary nature of the nodes. The researchers recommend evaluating 
the impact mobile nodes have on the transmission range, performance, capacity, 
and efficiency of the communication link. 
xii. This study conducted an initial financial analysis regarding the feasibility of 
acquiring, developing, deploying, and maintaining the software and hardware 
required to establish a space-based terminal to include in a BSMN topology. 
The researchers recommend a more robust financial analysis study to further 
evaluate the feasibility of developing other aspects of a BSMN such as 
acquiring, developing, deploying, and maintaining the software and hardware 
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